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I. Introduction
Having a fall birthday, especially one that falls around—
and sometimes on—Thanksgiving, can be troubling. In previous
years, I was often required to split time with close family and
friends who wanted to wish me a happy holiday season as well
as a happy birthday (all while inappropriately celebrating the
mass genocide of American Indians). On one such celebratory
occasion, I attended a dinner party hosted by a good friend. I
attended the dinner party with my closest fraternity brother.
He was accompanied by his fiancé. Always ones with
competitive spirits, my fraternity brother and I challenged his
fiancé and my good friend’s sister to a “friendly” game of
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Spades. 1 We played a quick game, one to 350 points. At the
end of the game, the score was “tied.” More correctly, my
fraternity brother and I had a score of 358 points. The ladies
had a score of 352 points. Under customary rules, my fraternity
brother and I would be declared the victors, for it is tradition—
in Spades—to declare the team with the most points when
either team or both teams surpass 350 points the winner of
the game.
That day would be different, though. My good friend’s
sister, who lived with my good friend, declared that the rules
of her house dictated a sudden death overtime hand of Spades.
My fraternity brother and I would play the requested hand
although we were both chagrined and bewildered at this
sudden rule change/announcement. We went on to win that
hand, too. We earned seven books; they earned six books. My
friend’s sister would preempt any further celebration and/or
exuberance by declaring that house rules required that the
victors win by a decisive number of books when the game is in
overtime. To this day, I am unsure as to how a score of 7–6 was
not decisive because seven is certainly and decidedly more than
six. We would ultimately play several hands before my
fraternity brother and I would lose a hand outright (8–5). The
game would end immediately. When my fraternity brother and
I protested, my friend’s sister asserted that she was simply
applying the house rules!
In a dispute over a card game, house rules dramatically
shifted the outcome(s) of the game. More importantly, the shift
in house rules provided an insurmountable barrier to achieving
my team’s goal: winning the game. As I prepared for my first
class (one about politics and power in education) as a tenuretrack faculty member, I re-read race-related education federal
court cases. In many ways, it appears that the Supreme
Court and other federal courts have endorsed the use of “house
rules” in race-related education cases, except the stakes are
much higher when considering the gatekeeper that a college
diploma may serve in opening or shutting doors to future
1. See generally WANDA GARNER, HOW TO PLAY SPADES (2012) (stating that
spades is a card game played with four players, though it can be played with
only two and the objective is to score 500 points before the opponents).
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educational, occupational, and social mobility. This paper
discusses the existence of house rules and the circumstances
necessary to perpetuate that power in both primary and
secondary education and higher education, acknowledging the
similarities between the use of house rules in both arenas.
II. The Half-Hearted Attempt to Desegregate Schools: The
Creation of a White Power to Dictate the Pace of Forgiveness via
Brown and its Progeny
The power of the pen may not always be mightier than
the power of the sword, but such is currently the case when
considering how the story of desegregating the nation’s public
schools is told. While many scholars debate the merits of
integrated public schools as opposed to segregated public schools
based on the nation’s failed attempt to desegregate its public
schools, little attention is paid to the fact that the nation never
wholeheartedly attempted to desegregate its schools. It is
necessary, then, to recast the facts of K-12 school desegregation
efforts as taken up by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court misplaced the power to dictate the pace of
desegregation and followed that misplacement with the
provision of an opt-out clause for those parents seeking shelter
from the requirement to desegregate the nation’s public schools.
Though often trumpeted as a victory, the Court’s decisions in
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 2 and much of its
progeny were empty promises that have not been fully
realized by later generations of minority students at the
secondary and primary levels of education. The Court’s
endorsement of a right for White Americans to be comfortable
with the speed and procedure of desegregation later developed
into the power to set house rules regarding the use of race in
education. As realized in the story provided in the introduction,
2. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954)
[hereinafter Brown I] (finding that “[s]eparate educational facilities are
inherently unequal,” and holding “plaintiffs and others similarly situated for
whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation
complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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one is in the proverbial catbird’s seat when he or she has the
power to set and adjust the house rules. The person who sets
the house rules always has the option of winning the game
since the house rules for winning may well change at their
discretion until the setter of house rules has won the game.
A. The Illusion of “Forced Integration:” The Court’s Approval of
Integration on the Terms of Whites
Since Plessy v. Ferguson, and even before that case, it was
legal to deny Black Americans entrance into public
accommodations that were thought to be reserved for White
Americans so long as there was a “separate but equal” facility
reserved for Black Americans. 3 The Supreme Court of the
United States invalidated segregative statutes and explicitly
overruled the holding in Plessy 4 that allowed for the separate
but equal education of Black students in Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka. 5 Despite the fact that the Black schools
had been or were being equalized in many cases, the Court
struck down the statutes and policies requiring the
segregation of public primary and secondary schools on the
grounds that segregated schools could not be made equal. 6 The
Court’s opinion in Brown I appeared and is sometimes
remembered to have been a forceful repudiation of the ugly
truths of racism and segregation, but such memories of the
watershed case ruled on in 1954 are nostalgic at best. Perhaps
these memories are even delusional. A passive reading of the
Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka II,
the remedies portions of Brown, reveals that the desegregation of
the nation’s public schools was not to be done immediately but
rather with “all deliberate speed.” 7
3. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (establishing the infamous phrase “separate but equal,” and
upholding the Louisiana statute requiring railway companies to maintain such
accommodations as valid).
4. Id.
5. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495.
6. Id. at 487–93.
7. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)
[hereinafter Brown II] (requiring that the defendants “make a prompt and
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What exactly did the Court mean by the phrase “all
deliberate speed”? 8 Tradition would create the perception that
attempts at desegregation in the primary and secondary school
settings of the United States occurred by force or judicial fiat;
neither case occurred in actuality. Far from the requirement of
desegregating all of the nation’s schools at once and at all costs,
the Court in Brown II ordered that schools be desegregated in
a method guided by equity. 9 Unfortunately, the idea of equity
was addressed from the perspective of White Americans who
had previously adopted systems intended to segregate the
nation’s public schools. 10 The most appalling focus of the
Court’s decision in Brown II is the High Court’s instruction that
equitable principles take into account “the public interest in the
elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective
manner.” 11 In other words, desegregation would move at the
pace that White Americans found comfortable. The Court’s
reasoning in the most exalted race-related education case
violated a core principle of forgiveness and restoration: those who
were wronged could only be made whole to the extent and at
the pace that those who wronged the victims found
appropriate. This reasoning flies in the face of concepts of
forgiveness. Thus, the myth that an activist court violated the
ability of White parents to choose the educational setting for
their children is a non-truth, if not an outright lie.
What pace did the public interest dictate? The pace of
desegregating the nation’s public schools was, in fact,
reasonable start to full compliance with [the Court’s] May 17, 1954 ruling.”).
8. See id. (“[T]he cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as
are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.”).
9. See id. (“[T]he courts will be guided by equitable principles.
Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping
its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity
power.”).
10. See generally Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine,
62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (analyzing Supreme Court cases in a discussion
questioning how Black Americans have become marginalized despite the
illegality of racial discrimination).
11. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 299–300.
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deliberate. It was deliberately slow to be exact. Over a decade
after the Court’s decisions in Brown I and Brown II, little had
changed in terms of the racial composition of the nation’s public
schools. 12 School districts devised plans that were intended to
give a mirage of school desegregation, but in effect did very
little to desegregate schools. In fact, some—if not most—of the
plans maintained the segregated school systems that existed
before Brown I and Brown II. So little had changed to address
the segregation of the nation’s public schools across many
locales in the nation that the Supreme Court decided to
deliver measurable criteria for determining whether districts
had effectively desegregated its schools. The thrust of cases
like Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County
and Green v. County School Board of New Kent County was that
recalcitrant school districts could purportedly no longer overtly
or covertly avoid the desegregation of their publicly-funded
schools. 13
White Americans had been given great leniency in
remedying the immediate and lasting effects of segregated
schools after their efforts to segregate and mistreat Black
students. Presumably, the Court imagined that White
Americans, who had supported the segregation of the nation’s
public schools, would openly accept the idea of desegregated
schools. Having offered that the desegregation of the nation’s
public schools must occur but at a pace that is acceptable to
White Americans, the Supreme Court had given preference to
the psyches of White Americans over the equitable interests of
Black Americans. The school desegregation cases were no longer
about the wrong that White Americans had done to Black
Americans, the school desegregation cases were now about
how White Americans could most easily accept the new
12. Compare Griffin v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cty., 377 U.S. 218,
233–34 (1964) (commenting that school closures did not comply with the “all
deliberate speed” requirement, and these children were being denied their
constitutional right to “an education equal to that afforded by the public schools
in the other parts of Virginia”), and Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty.,
Va., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) (finding that the school board’s plan had
impermissibly created a dual system).
13. See Brown II, supra note 7, at 298 (providing cases showing examples of
school districts employing plans that failed to comport with the “all deliberate
speed” requirement).
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realities of desegregated schools. Against this backdrop, the
Court would sanction what started as an attempt of
recalcitrant White populations to wait out the national will to
desegregate (which was successful) and what later transformed
into a blatant return to a system that explicitly advantaged
White Americans’ ideas of segregation in the K-12 setting and
(later) preferential admissions in the higher education
settings. 14
B. The Delusional Responses to Efforts to “Forcibly” Integrate
Public Schools in the United States: The Development, Banning,
and Approval of School Choice Models
The pace of desegregation was painfully slow for Black
Americans. Some school districts created school choice plans;
these plans had various manifestations and avoided any
meaningful integration of public schools. In Prince Edward
County, Virginia, school choice manifested itself in the form of
divestment. 15 The school district decided to defund its public
schools while creating a voucher program that would afford
White students the equivalent of public education at segregated
private schools. 16 In New Kent County, Virginia, school choice
took the form of freedom of choice plans. 17 Under these plans, a
student would generally be assigned to whichever school the
student previously attended prior to the plan’s adoption unless
the student’s parent made an official request to transfer to
another school. 18
14. See id. at 299 (“School authorities have the primary responsibility for
elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider
whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of
the governing constitutional principles.”).
15. See generally Griffin, 377 U.S.
16. See id. at 221–26 (enacting a new tuition grant program and making
school attendance a matter of local option).
17. See Green, 391 U.S. at 431 (allowing a pupil to choose his own public
school).
18. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., Va., 391 U.S. 430, 433–34
(1968) (stating that “each pupil except those entering the first and eighth
grades, may annually choose between the New Kent and Watkins schools and
pupils not making a choice were assigned to the school previously attended; first
and eighth grade pupils must affirmatively choose a school.”).
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As one might expect, freedom of choice plans did not result
in schools that were substantially more desegregated than was
the case immediately preceding the school desegregation cases. 19
Moreover, freedom of choice plans placed the onus of
desegregating the nation’s public schools on Black parents and
students as opposed to placing the burden of desegregation on
the states that had sanctioned racial segregation in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 20
Some other districts, particularly those in the Deep South,
arranged to supply vouchers for families to send their schoolage students to private sectarian schools, which were believed
to have the right to discriminate on racial bases. 21 Other White
enclaves—or
disproportionately
White
areas
within
predominately Black areas—chose o r a t t e m p t e d to secede
from school districts and create alternative, predominately
White school districts. 22 This was especially the case of those
districts subject to court supervision and
ordered to
desegregate under the watch of the federal courts.
School districts outside of the Deep South were implicated in
the school choice escape from integration as well. The Denver
Public Schools chose to situate school buildings in areas that

19. See id. at 441–42 (“In three years of operation not a single white child
has chosen to attend Watkins school and although 115 Negro children enrolled
in New Kent school in 1967, 85% of the Negro children in the system still attend
the all-Negro Watkins school.”).
20. See id. at 442 (describing how the plan operated simply to burden
children and their parents with a responsibility which Brown II placed on the
School Board).
21. See, e.g., Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 471 (1973) (vacating the
decision of the lower court and holding that the Mississippi book-lending
program was constitutionally infirm in that it significantly aided organization
and continuation of separate system of private schools which might discriminate
if they so desired).
22. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 482–83
(1972) (stating that the city’s creation of a school district is not permissible
when the effect of this districting would impede the dismantling of a dual
system when the county school system had been found to be in violation of the
Constitution); United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484,
490–91 (1972) (indicating that carving out a school district, in which 57% of
students would be white while 43% would be African American is not permitted,
when 89% of students in the remaining district frustrates attempts to eliminate
a dual system).
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would be prohibitive to attempts at desegregation. 23 There
seemed to be no end to the litany of ingenious and imaginative
plans to disrupt efforts at desegregation. In the name of
parents having free choice over the educational settings of their
school-age students, White Americans thwarted attempts at
segregation after having been successful at waiting out the
national will to desegregate those same public schools.
The Court saw fit to remedy many manifestations of school
choice having seen these efforts as thinly veiled attempts to
end-run desegregation attempts. The Court, until the mid1970s, judicially vetoed attempts to sidestep desegregation
through school choice models, but one form of school choice
proved friendly to the Court and remains contemporaneously
insurmountable for advocates of desegregation. In Milliken v.
Bradley I, 24 the Court endorsed a “suburban veto” 25 to
desegregation attempts. 26 Under the Court’s ruling in Milliken
I, those seeking to avoid desegregation could relocate their
residency to the suburbs and be absolved of responsibility to
make right the immediate and lingering advantages that had
resulted from the segregation of public schools. 27 The curse of
Milliken lives on and manifests itself as an obstacle to redress
a past history of state-sponsored segregation as well as
23. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 213–14
(1973) (describing how actions of a school board known to support racial and
ethnic segregation that resulted in prohibited racially and ethnically
segregated schools shifted the burden of proving that segregated schools in
their district were not intentionally segregated).
24. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 761–62 (1974) [hereinafter
Milliken I] (stating it was inappropriate to impose a multi-district solution when
one district operated a unitary school system or acted in a way that effected
segregation without allowing other districts to argue if that remedy was
appropriate or provide evidence whether these other districts ran afoul of the
Constitution).
25. See generally James E. Ryan, Brown, School Choice, and the Suburban
Veto, 90 VA. L. REV. 1635 (2004) (explaining how Brown extended the
availability of school choice into our contemporary era and how that affects
integration).
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of
American Public Education: the Court’s Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1597–1622
(2003) (explaining how the court decisions aiming to end desegregation put
American schools on a path towards greater inequality).

DIFFERENT SCRIPT, SAME CASTE

307

address the resegregation of the nation’s public schools.
Ironically, Milliken’s effect mostly protects the right of
northerners to avoid desegregation. Because school districts in
the South are generally countywide and expansive, it is more
difficult for those avoiding desegregation to vacate the school
district without also moving well beyond reasonable driving
distance to the benefits of the inner city. 28
The opposite is true in the North. Geographically smaller
school districts allow for those avoiding school desegregation to
dodge the desegregation of public schools while remaining well
within reasonable commuting distance to the inner city,
sometimes within the very same county. 29 Thus, the Court—with
its pronouncement in Milliken—created a pressure release
valve for those attempting to avoid desegregation of the
nation’s public schools, particularly in the North where school
segregation was viewed as a southern problem. 30 To be
abundantly clear, the Court chose to prefer the interest of
White Americans when attempting to remedy the wrongs of
desegregation and to particularly dictate the pace of
desegregation efforts.
There was very little public interest, however, in
desegregating the nation’s public schools; to the contrary,
school districts created school choice plans that would protect
the status quo of segregated public schools. The Court realized
that these plans were for the purpose of avoiding the
desegregation of the nation’s public schools and banned the
use of those plans as methods for desegregating the nation’s
public schools (at least as those plans were then constructed
and applied). The Court went on to accept a later manifestation
of school choice that allowed White parents to flee inner cities
yet maintain the benefits of living close to the inner cities
28. See generally CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND
RETREAT OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (2004) (analyzing how Brown's most visible
effect—contact between students of different racial groups—has changed over
the fifty years since the decision).
29. See id. at 8 (describing how it is not unusual for suburban school
district to be small in the Northeast and Midwest, so that families living in some
of the largest metropolitan areas in the country had dozens of school districts
from which to choose).
30. See generally Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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that the parents had fled. Put most simply, the Court allowed
White Americans to set the terms for desegregation of the
nation’s public schools since White Americans would control
the pace and scope of desegregation.
White Americans would go on to use school choice to
change the rules to desegregation attempts and change the
conversation about school desegregation. School desegregation
would become more about the right of parents to choose the
setting(s) of their child’s schooling as opposed to providing for
schooling in a desegregated context. When all was said and
done, more was said than done: White Americans maintained
power in the politics of education, even after the school
desegregation cases. For many Black families and students, the
current context of educational equity is often worse than was the
case before attempts at desegregation. 31 In effect, the
desegregation of schools produced a different script because
the actions after desegregation were new manifestations of
power and privilege, but the desegregation of public schools
in the United States produced the same caste since equitable
access to public schools remained out of reach for nearly all
Black school-aged children, especially if one defines equitable
access as the ability to attend desegregated schools.
III. How the Court’s Decisions in K-12 Desegregation Cases Led
to Decisions in Later Affirmative Action Cases: Protecting the
Power to Set House Rules
The Court’s decisions regarding the desegregation of
primary and secondary schools are instructive in the results of
affirmative action cases in higher education. Though generally
thought of as isolated lines of case law, the K-12 and higher
education cases bear a striking resemblance to each other. The
end result is the same: White Americans get to set the rules
for the game. When White Americans can no longer win with
31. See GARY OREFIELD ET AL., E PLURIBUS . . . SEPARATION: DEEPENING
DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR MORE STUDENTS 42 (2012) (noting that school
segregation across the United States is substantially worse than it was forty
years ago and that black segregation is increasing in the Southern States and
remains high in others).
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the rules that they set, the Supreme Court’s role is to give its
approbation to rule changes that are proposed by White
Americans. Recall that the Court allowed White Americans to
set the pace of the desegregation of the nation’s public schools.
The Court did, however, order that the desegregation must
appear to have occurred. When White Americans could no
longer outlast the nation’s will for desegregated schools, the
Court acquiesced in the proposal to allow White parents to opt
out of school desegregation via the decision in Milliken I.32
Milliken II, effectively the remedies portion of Milliken I,
was decided in 1977. 33 Only a year after Milliken II, the Court
would entertain its first affirmative action case. That
affirmative action case is similar to the K-12 desegregation
cases because the result of that case (and subsequent affirmative
action cases) was that White Americans would continue to enjoy
academic environments that were for the most part free of Black
students (and some other racial minorities). More than that,
the cases are similar in that White Americans maintained the
benefit of setting the house rules. As will be detailed below,
the Court used the affirmative action cases to cement the power
to control the house rules in favor of White Americans. This
occurred in three phases.
First, the Court would allow White Americans to determine
which indicators were accorded the most weight in admissions
processes. Of course, White applicants went on to choose the
indicators that most benefitted them. The Court then went on
to declare that White applicants who are presumptively more
qualified than applicants who are racial minorities should not
be denied admission into incoming classes.
Next, the Court would allow the rule in the first case to
transform to allow White applicants to challenge the
admission of admittedly equally qualified applicants who are
racial minorities. The Court entertained the second set of cases
32. See Milliken I, at 745 (1974) (“Conversely, without an interdistrict
violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling for an
interdistrict remedy.”).
33. See Milliken v. Bradley II, 433 U.S. 267, 289–91 (1977) [hereinafter
Milliken II] (entitling as part of a desegregation decree, compensatory or
remedial educational programs for schoolchildren subjected to past acts of de
jure segregation at defrayed costs).
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although there was no indication that the minority applicants
were under- or unqualified as relative to the nonminority
applicants. The chief complaint of the plaintiffs in those
cases, therefore, was they could not believe that they would
not be preferred even as compared to equally qualified racial
minorities. Having lost this battle in the judiciary, the Court
would later allow opponents of affirmative action in that same
state to place the civil rights of minorities to a popular vote.
Finally, the Court would let the power of house rules
develop into the right of under- or unqualified White applicants
to challenge the admission of more qualified minority
candidates, almost assuring that White applicants would become
mandatory winners. Not much in the K-12 context is different
than in the context of affirmative action cases: racial minorities
may pursue equity so long as White Americans are prohibitive
favorites and perpetual winners in that pursuit. The following
subsections of this Article will detail how the Supreme Court
has maintained the White privilege to set the house rules as
well as sanctioned the enhancement of that privilege. Indeed,
this argument requires a recasting of the facts of affirmative
action cases.
A. More than Forgiveness on Their Terms: The Supreme Court
Sanctions the White Power of “House Rules” via Bakke
The Court first addressed the issue of programs that
sought to include racial minorities who had previously been
marginalized in higher education in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke. 34 In sum, Allan Bakke, a white male
applicant, applied for admission into the University of
California-Davis Medical School. 35 The University of CaliforniaDavis Medical School operated two separate application review
pools. 36 One was aimed at white applicants and minorities who
34. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 (1978)
(deciding that a medical school's admission program that used racial
classifications violated the Fourteenth Amendment; however, the school's goals
in using racial classifications could be legitimately served by the competitive
consideration of race).
35. Id. at 276.
36. Id.
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were not underrepresented in the Medical School. 37 The other
was aimed at minority applicants who were underrepresented at
the Medical School. 38 Bakke’s grade point average was slightly
below the average of the White applicants from the general
application pool and well above the average of those students
admitted under the special application pool. 39 Bakke’s
standardized test scores far outpaced students accepted
through either applicant pool. 40 His interview received mixed
reviews although the highest-ranking official of the
admissions committee was not impressed with Bakke’s inperson interview during Bakke’s second application cycle. 41 After
being denied admission to the Medical School in both 1973 and
1974, Bakke filed suit in the Superior Court of California,
alleging that the admissions program constituted a violation of
his right to equal protection of laws under the California and
United States constitutions and a violation of Title VI of the
37. See id. at 274 (identifying the classes of persons eligible for the special
admissions program). In 1973, applicants were considered under the special
admissions program if they self-identified as “economically and/or educationally
disadvantaged” on the 1973 application form. In 1974, applicants were eligible
for the special admissions program if they self-identified on the 1974 application
form as belonging to certain minority groups, effectively limited to “Blacks,”
“Chicanos,” “Asians,” and “American Indians.” The term “disadvantaged” was
not formally defined, but self-identified applicants had their applications
reviewed for eligibility on a case-by-case basis. In 1974, the special admissions
program only considered “disadvantaged” applicants who were members of one
of the designated minority groups. Id. at 274–76.
38. See id. at 274–75 (stating that a special admissions program operated
with a separate committee, a majority of whom were members of minority
groups).
39. See id. at 277 n.7 (comparing Bakke’s grade point averages with those
of applicants admitted through the regular and special admissions programs in
both the 1973 and 1974 application cycles). In 1973, Bakke’s overall grade point
average was 0.03 points lower than the average for “regular” admittees and 0.58
points higher than the average for “special” admittees. In 1974, Bakke’s overall
grade point average was 0.17 points higher than the average for “regular”
admittees and 0.84 points higher than the average for “special” admittees. Id.
40. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265 (comparing
Bakke’s MCAT percentiles with those of applicants admitted through both the
regular and special admissions programs in both the 1973 and 1974 application
cycles).
41. See id. at 276–77 (noting that Bakke’s faculty interviewer in 1973
considered Bakke “a very desirable applicant” while his faculty interviewer in
1974 gave Bakke his lowest rating out of six reviewers’ scores).
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 because he could not compete for the
16 (out of 100) seats reserved for underrepresented racial
minorities. 42 The California trial court determined that the
Medical School’s admission program violated the United States
and California constitutions and Title VI, but that Bakke had
not sufficiently shown he would have been admitted but for the
special admissions program. 43 The case was then transferred
directly to the California Supreme Court, which ultimately
determined that the admissions program violated the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and that
Bakke was entitled to admission because the university could
not show that Bakke would not have been admitted even
without the special admissions program. 44 After granting
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held in favor of
Bakke and ordered the Medical School to admit Bakke in
contravention of the Medical School’s desires. 45
The Court’s decision in Bakke privileged White applicants
seeking admission into competitive state-sponsored academic
programs. Despite the fact that every applicant was evaluated
on a number of criteria, Allan Bakke argued for and the Court
approved that his test scores would become the primary
measure for his suitability for enrollment at the University of
California-Davis Medical School. 46 Surely, Bakke’s test scores
and grade point average far outpaced those of the applicants
admitted under the special program, but it is uncontested that
the director of admissions found Bakke’s interview to be
lacking on numerous accounts. 47 Setting aside the exceptional
test scores that Mr. Bakke submitted and the fairly competitive
grade point average achieved in his coursework, there was no
particularly explicit reason why Mr. Bakke’s poor performance
42. Id. at 277–78.
43. Id. at 277–79.
44. Id. at 279–81.
45. Id. at 271–72.
46. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272–280 (1978).
47. See id. at 276–77 (describing how Bakke had written to the chairman of
the admissions committee complaining about the special admissions program
after being denied admittance in 1973 and how, in 1974, that same person
conducted Bakke’s faculty interview and subsequently gave Bakke his lowest
rating out of all reviewers).
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on the interview portion of his admissions process was to be
excused. 48 The only reasonable reason for ordering Allan
Bakke’s admission into the Medical School in spite of his poor
interview was that the rules would be different for White
applicants than for applicants from underrepresented racial
minority groups. All applicants would be measured by several
measures, but White applicants would get to weigh the
application process in a manner that highlighted their strengths
as opposed to weaknesses. Thus, White applicants would be
assured to be perpetual winners in the higher education
application process.
That the Court sought to shift the rules to maintain the
privileged position of White applicants to elite state schools is
evident in at least one other instance of the Court’s opinion in
Bakke. Diversity was to be considered a variety of soft factors
after the decision in Bakke. 49 Relying on language from the
admission process at Harvard University, the Court sanctioned
the use of various forms of diversity that go beyond racial and
ethnic diversity. 50 While such measures are not in conflict with
efforts towards racial diversity, they may be if such efforts at
diversity displace efforts at racial diversity with race-neutral
efforts at diversity that maintain the privileged position of
White applicants. This can easily become the case when
accounting for sex, class, religion, geography, etc. The categories
promoted by Harvard’s policy are not exact proxies for race,
and they may actually be more beneficial to White applicants
who are still the majority of applicants in each of these areas
by nature of their majority in the general population. Once
again, the Court expressed a willingness to protect the privileged
position of White applicants at the expense of minority
applicants. The Court approved the consideration of diversity,
but only insofar as diversity would also benefit White

48. See id. (declining to expressly consider whether Bakke’s interviewers in
1974 were explicitly biased against Bakke, nor otherwise questioning the
validity of Bakke’s 1974 interview scores).
49. See id. at 317 (explaining that ethnic diversity could be considered a
“plus” factor as part of a matrix of other nonobjective factors).
50. See id. at 316–20 (stating that race or ethnic background is simply one
element to be weighted fairly against other elements).
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applicants while
applicants.
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B. Changing the “House Rules”: Grutter, Gratz, and the
Preference for Whites over Equally Qualified Black, Brown, and
Native Applicants
Notwithstanding the result in Bakke, most people would
sympathize with Mr. Bakke. Under what he perceived to be
the objective standard of evaluating merit, Mr. Bakke believed
himself to have outclassed the competition on this “objective”
measures. It is easy to understand how the admissions
committee might have rejected Allan Bakke given his poor
performance at his in-person interview (on the second
application). The Supreme Court, however, appeared to bless
White applicants for admission into higher education with a
right to admission, at least as preferred against racial
minorities. The Court allowed Bakke to determine which
criteria for merit was given greater weight in his admissions
process. Although it was well understood that minority
applicants would have to do well on both the objective and
subjective portions of the application process, Bakke’s results
changed the rules for nonminority applicants. Under the new
rules, White applicants’ admissibility could practically be
measured by performance on standardized tests alone. 51 The
effect of this rule change in combination with the Court’s lack
of resolve to end segregation in the nation’s public elementary
and secondary schools was that White Americans were able to
avoid the presence of minority students throughout their
educational experiences.
The Court did not hear another case on affirmative action
until roughly twenty-five years after Bakke. The Supreme
Court would hear two cases from the same university at that
time. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court upheld the
use of affirmative action measures in the admissions decisions
51. See id. at 320 (stating that Medical School could not carry its burden of
proving that, but for the existence of its unlawful special admissions program,
respondent still would not have been admitted).
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at the University of Michigan’s law school. 52 The Supreme
Court preceded its decision in Grutter by striking down the use
of affirmative action measures in the admissions decisions for
undergraduate students at the University of Michigan in
Gratz v. Bollinger. 53 The law school and undergraduate
admissions processes contained different fact patterns and,
therefore, produced variant rulings according to the Court.
The University of Michigan’s law school individually
scrutinized each applicant and whether the applicant could use
life experiences to influence the culture of the law school. 54
Barbara Grutter, a white female applicant from Michigan,
applied for admission into the law school at the University of
Michigan. 55 The University of Michigan’s law school is
considered one of the most prestigious public law schools in
the United States and is perennially considered to be one of
the most sought after law schools (whether public or private)
by most peer institutions and law school applicants. 56 Given the
competitive nature of admissions into the law school, many
applicants—including Barbara Grutter—did not receive
affirmative admissions decisions during her application cycle. 57
To the contrary, the undergraduate admissions process at the
University of Michigan afforded a set amount of points, twenty

52. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333–34 (2003) (holding that the
affirmative action admissions program at University of Michigan Law school,
which used a strict points system to grade applicants and allotted points for the
applicants’ racial diversity, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause).
53. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 246 (2003) (holding that the
University’s use of race in its current freshman admissions policy was not
narrowly tailored to achieve respondents’ asserted interest in diversity,
violating the Equal Protection Clause).
54. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306 (“Focusing on students’ academic ability
coupled with a flexible assessment of their talents, experiences, and potential,
the policy requires admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on all
the information available in the file. . .”).
55. See id. at 316–17 (describing how Barbara Grutter had a 3.8 GPA and a
161 LSAT score).
56. See id. at 313 (stating that the law school receives more than 3,500
applications each year for a class of around 350 students).
57. See id. at 313–17 (explaining that the law school received more than
ten times as many applicants as there were seats available for the entering class
and that Grutter was initially placed on the waiting list and then rejected).
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to be exact, to all racial minorities. 58 The purported effect of
the addition of twenty points was that “virtually every
qualified
underrepresented
minority
applicant
[was]
admitted.” 59
Jennifer Gratz applied for admission to the University of
Michigan as an incoming freshman for the fall semester in
1995. 60 She was denied admission. 61 Patrick Hamacher applied
for admission as an incoming freshman for the fall semester
in 1997. 62 Like Jennifer Gratz, Hamacher was denied
admission into his sought after incoming class. 63 The Court
struck down the University of Michigan’s use of affirmative
action in its undergraduate admissions process. 64
Though the Supreme Court states that Michigan
affirmative action cases present different issues, that
statement does not confront the striking similarities of the
plaintiffs’ arguments. The arguments in both Grutter and Gratz
are the same: White applicants should be preferred to Black
applicants who are admittedly equally qualified. In both
Michigan cases, there is never an allegation that racial
minorities who received admission to the University of Michigan
were under- or unqualified. 65 Moreover, in both cases the
plaintiffs accepted—as was required by the circumstances—that
the racial minorities at issue were just as qualified as the
58. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 258 (2003) (noting that an
applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group is
automatically awarded 20 points of the 100 needed to guarantee admission).
59. Id. at 244, 274.
60. See id. at 251 (stating that Gratz’s admission had been delayed because
she was “well qualified” but “less competitive than the students who had been
admitted on first review” and then rejected).
61. See id. (noting that after LSA rejected her, she enrolled in the
University of Michigan at Dearborn and graduated in the spring of 1999).
62. See id. (rejecting his application in April 1997).
63. See id. (delaying his application initially because his “academic
credentials were in the qualified range” but “were not at the level needed for
first review admission.”).
64. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (striking down the
undergraduate admissions policy because it was not narrowly tailored to achieve
asserted compelling interest in diversity).
65. Id. at 303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
337–38 (2003).
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Whit e plaintiffs. 66 Were this not the case, the plaintiffs’ cases
would be moot since the plaintiffs would then be asserting that
they, themselves, would be under- or unqualified for
admission. The plaintiffs’ arguments in Grutter and Gratz
stands in juxtaposition to the argument presented in Bakke,
where the allegation—however misguided—was that Bakke
was more qualified than the admitted racial minorities on
some measures. The cases of Grutter and Gratz differed from
the case of Bakke in that there was scantly an argument that
minorities were under or unqualified; the facts dictated that
minority applicants were viewed as equally as qualified as the
non-admitted White applicants.
White Americans, the setters and keepers of the house
rules, needed to change the rules to fit this new reality. There
needed to be a path to assure White applicants would be
preferred over not only purportedly under- or unqualified
minority applicants but also equally qualified minority
applicants. The Court’s decision to even hear a case premised
largely on the fact that the University of Michigan admitted
several minority applicants over an equally qualified White
applicant where there were a limited number of available seats
signaled a shift in the rules. There was a new rule of equality
and equity: in a battle of equally qualified minority and
nonminority applicants, White
applicants
could
force
universities to explain why Black candidates were chosen
over White candidates. Not shockingly, the non-admitted White
applicants in Grutter and Gratz failed to challenge the
admission of White applicants who were both less qualified
than the non-admitted White plaintiffs and were also admitted
into their respective programs. With this being the case, it is
difficult to agree that the plaintiffs in the University of
Michigan cases were forthright in alleging that the gravamen
of their cases were that minority students were preferred in
the University of Michigan’s admissions processes; instead, the
66. Compare Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (“Every applicant admitted under the current plan, petitioners do
not here dispute, is qualified under the current plan”), with Grutter, 539 U.S. at
337–38 (“With respect to the use of race itself, all underrepresented minority
students admitted by the Law School have been deemed qualified.”).
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true issue here was that minority applicants—no matter how
qualified—were selected above White applicants.
The Court’s analysis of difference misses the mark on
another similarity of Grutter and Gratz. Both cases fail to
acknowledge that qualified minority applicants might
contribute to the diversity of the student body in intersectional
manners. In both cases, the Court counts the sheer number
of racial minorities, but the Court fails to acknowledge the
unique intersections between the status of racial minorities as
individuals. The Court and the plaintiffs assume that all
racial minorities are the same. The Court’s error manifests
itself differently in both cases. In Grutter, the Court argues
that the law school’s process accounts for other forms of
diversity allowing for nonracial minorities to take advantage of
the individualized review process. 67 In Gratz, the Court asserts
that the twenty-point value assigned to racial minorities is
determinative in the admissions process assuring that
“virtually every” underrepresented racial minority was
admitted. 68 The assertion ignores the fact that those students
might have collected points for being both Native American
and the nation’s premier oboist. Likewise, one could have
received points for both being Latina and a prized
entrepreneur. Similarly, one could have received points for
being a Black female who was raised in poverty yet also an
exalted scientist. In many ways, the Court’s handling of the
Michigan cases proved that racial minorities were and
remained to be considered static beings who contribute to
diversity in a very limited manner while White applicants ar e
dynamic and contribute to diversity in a plethora of ways. This
was not a new rule; this was simply a shifting of the rules
pertaining to diversity.

67. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (“Here, the Law School engages in a highly
individualized, holistic review of each applicant’s file, giving serious
consideration to all the ways an applicant might contribute to a diverse
educational environment.”).
68. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 274 (explaining that awarding 20 points to
minorities ignores each student’s individual characteristics that contribute to
diversity). The Court’s analysis did not consider racial minorities who might
have been admitted without the 20 points.
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White applicants in the Michigan cases merely took
advantage of the rule created in Bakke: diversity was
acceptable so long as diversity allowed White applicants to be
presumptive and perpetual winners in admission to prestigious
state-sponsored universities. White applicants could now,
however, publicly call to question universities when that
presumption did not bear proper and appropriate results (i.e.,
White students being admitted to competitive state universities
at the near exclusion of Black and Brown students). The Court’s
involvement in the Gratz and Grutter cases would pave the
way for a broader and more appalling change to the rules of
access and equity in college admissions.
C. The Debate Moves Between Un(der)qualified Whites and
Qualified Minorities: Under New House Rules Whites
Must Always Win
In 2013, the Supreme Court f i r s t heard the case of
Abigail Fisher, a White woman denied admission to the
prestigious University of Texas at Austin. 69 The facts of Fisher
v. University of Texas at Austin70 are also relatively simple. The
University of Texas at Austin automatically admits all students
graduating in the top decile of their graduating classes from
public high schools in the state of Texas. 71 These seats
comprise about four of every five seats in the incoming class
at the University of Texas’ Austin campus. 72 The remaining
seats—as few as they are—are filled through a holistic review
process that assesses an applicant’s academic performance in
69. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014)
(affirming the Supreme Court order remanding the case to the Court of Appeals
and denying the University’s motion to remand the case to District Court).
70. See generally id. (holding that University had demonstrated that raceconscious holistic review was necessary to make Top Ten Percent plan workable
by patching holes that mechanical admissions program left in its ability to
achieve rich diversity that contributed to its academic mission).
71. See id. at 637 (stating that Fisher did not graduate in the top ten
percent of her class and did not therefore qualify for automatic admission under
the Top Ten Percent Plan, which that year took 81% of the seats available for
Texas residents).
72. Id.
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combination with the applicant’s personal achievements and
contributions to diversity. 73 There are no specific weights or
parameters for identifying and measuring diversity. 74 Although
all applicants may merit an individual review of their
application, the University does exclude some students not in
the t op decile of their graduating classes in Texas from
further consideration
based
on
inadequate
academic
performance alone. 75 Abigail Fisher did not complete high
school in the top ten percent of her graduating class although
she did graduate from a high school in Texas. 76 She was later
excluded from further consideration for admission to the
University of Texas at Austin due to test scores, grades and
high school course selection that the University of Texas deemed
inadequate as compared to the other applications not
automatically admitted, notwithstanding whether those
applicants were minority or nonminority. 77
Abigail Fisher, disappointed with her inability to achieve
admission into the elite public university of her home state,
sued alleging that the University’s efforts to admit Black and
Brown students prevented her admission to the University of
Texas at Austin. 78 The case was heard at the United States
District Court for Western Texas, which awarded summary
judgment in favor of the University of Texas. 79 The generally
73. See id. at 637 (describing how Fisher became one of 17,131 applicants
for the remaining 1,216 seats for Texas residents because she was considered
under the holistic review program, which looks past class rank to evaluate each
applicant as an individual based on his or her achievements and experiences).
74. See id. at 638 (stating that race is a factor considered in the unique
context of applicant’s entire experience, and it may be a beneficial factor for a
minority or non-minority student).
75. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 638–39 (explaining
how Abigail Fisher would have not been admitted because her Academic Index
Score was assessed at 3.1, and no students under 3.5 were admitted under
holistic review).
76. See id. at 637 (stating the circumstances in which Fisher had graduated
high school).
77. Id. at 638–39.
78. See id. at 644–45 (implying that Fisher’s concern was that students
who are racial minorities and not her poor performance was the reason she was
denied admission to the University of Texas at Austin).
79. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F.Supp.2d 587, 613 (W.D.
Tex. 2009) (stating that as long as Grutter remained good law, the University’s
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conservative Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s issuance of summary judgment. 80 The Supreme Court
vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case to the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for further proceedings. 81 On
remand, the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed summary judgment. 82 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, oral arguments were held on
December 9, 2015, 83 and the Court has since upheld the
University of Texas at Austin’s use of race in its holistic review
process. 84
Although the federal court’s rulings in previous cases
pertaining to education and race, particularly affirmative action
cases, were troubling, that the federal courts would entertain
Abigail Fisher’s case sets aside all previous understandings of
the role of race in education. In doing so, the federal courts
authorized and effectively reified the right of all Whites to
challenge the very presence of Black and Brown students on
selective, public university campuses. As noted in previous
sections, the plaintiff in Bakke argued that he was more
qualified than the racial minorities admitted through the
Affirmative Action program at the University of CaliforniaDavis Medical School. 85 The plaintiffs in both Grutter and Gratz
argued that they were just as qualified as the racial minorities
admissions program was constitutional).
80. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011)
(“Finally it is neither our role nor purpose to dance from Grutter’s firm holding
that diversity is an interest supporting compelling necessity.”).
81. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2412 (2013)
[hereinafter Fisher I] (holding that the Court of Appeals did not apply the
correct standard of scrutiny).
82. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir.
2014) (“With the benefit of additional briefing, oral argument, and the
ordered exacting scrutiny, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment.”).
83. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 135 S. Ct. 2888, 2888 (2015)
[hereinafter Fisher II] (granting certiorari); see also Fisher v. University of
Texas, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2015/14-981 (last visited Jan. 5, 2016)
(outlining the status of Fisher II).
84. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S.Ct. 2198, 2202 (2016)
(holding that the university’s admissions program did not violate equal
protection).
85. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 276–81 (1978)
(explaining the Plaintiff’s argument that less qualified students were being
admitted and thus he was being discriminated against based on his race).
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who were admitted through the University of Michigan’s
affirmative action programs. 86 Bakke, Grutter and Gratz all
brought into question which qualifications were most
important. 87 Fisher’s argument diverged from the previous
arguments, although those arguments were also weak in
nature and privileged White Americans, in that Fisher’s
argument was never that she was more or as equally as
qualified as the minorities applicants who were admitted to
the University of Texas at Austin. 88 Abigail Fisher did not
finish her high school experience ranked in the top ten percent
of her graduating class; thus, she was ineligible for automatic
admission into the University. 89
The University offered Fisher another chance at admission
through a holistic review process that evaluated her
qualifications outside of class rank. 90 The holistic review process
afforded 17,131 applicants as chance at 1,216 remaining seats in
the freshmen class at the University of Texas at Austin. 91 The
applicant pool for holistic review is dramatically and drastically
more academically competitive than the applicant pool of
86. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 317 (2003) (explaining that
petitioner felt she was discriminated against because she was denied admission
although she had credentials similar to applicants from disfavored racial groups
who had a greater chance of being admitted); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244, 251–57 (2003) (detailing the admissions process used by the
University of Michigan and how the petitioners’ scores compared to qualified
minority students’ scores).
87. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276–81 (explaining that Bakke challenged the
assessment of his merit that placed the totality of his qualification in a less
favorable measurement in relation to his test scores, which by far outpaced
most, if not all, other candidates); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 317 (describing
the admission system used and detailing the petitioners’ argument that the
objective components of their applications—grade point average and test
scores—should outweigh the composite assessment of total qualifications of
minority applicants); Gratz, 539 U.S. at 251–57 (describing the admission
system used).
88. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014)
(arguing that the University’s race-conscious admissions program violated the
Fourteenth Amendment).
89. See id. (detailing Fisher’s academic achievements and qualifications).
90. See id. (evaluating each applicant as an individual based on his or her
experiences).
91. See id. (stating that 81% of the seats available for Texas residents were
taken by students qualifying under the Top Ten Percent Plan the year Fisher
applied).
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students graduating in the top decile of their high school
graduating classes in public high schools in Texas. 92 Even for
the most competitive applicants, the competition would be
fierce; approximately seven percent of applicants are offered
admission through the holistic review process. 93 Fisher was not,
however, the most competitive applicant; in fact, Abigail
Fisher was not even minimally qualified. 94 No applicant—
whether minority or nonminority—was admitted at or below
Fisher’s Academic Index, which takes into account an
applicant’s test scores, grades and high school coursework. 95
Fisher was excluded for falling below the minimum Academic
Index required for further consideration for admissions into
the University of Texas. 96 The reality is that Fisher was not
admitted in her application cycle without any fault at all
assigned to efforts to admit minority applicants. 97
It is also not true that Abigail Fisher did not get admitted
because of her mediocre academic credentials, as has been
argued. Abigail Fisher was not admitted to the University of
Texas at Austin in 2008 because her qualifications were
lackluster and otherwise below minimal expectations. Abigail
Fisher was under- or un-qualified for admission into the
University of Texas. In fact, Fisher alternatively argued that
the University should have altered its selection process for the
benefit of admitting her (and other White applicants) into the
class. 98 The plaintiff argues for complete reliance on the “ Top
92. See id. at 650 (stating that the Top Ten Percent students had an
average standardized test score of 1219, 66 points lower than the average
standardized test score of 1285 attained by holistic review admittees).
93. See id. at 637–38 (explaining that 81 percent of available spots were
filled by students in the top 10% of their class, so the rest of the remaining
applicants would be admitted through the holistic review process and that
17,131 applicants competed for 1,216 seats).
94. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 638–39 (5th Cir.
2014) (describing how Fisher’s “Academic Index” scores were too low for
admission to her preferred academic programs at UT Austin).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 639 (explaining how the University did not admit students
unless their AI exceeded 3.5, and Fisher’s was 3.1).
97. See generally id.
98. See id. at 656 (discussing Abigail Fisher’s argument that socio-economic
status would be a race-neutral method of assuring racial diversity). In doing so,
the Fifth Circuit explains that socio-economic status would benefit White
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Ten Percent” plan, which would have ironically left her without
admission but might have resulted in fewer Black and Brown
admittees or for reliance on class, which maintains privilege for
White Americans (although not particularly Fisher). 99 Both the
Top Ten Percent plan and the holistic review processes
overrepresented Whites in the admissions process. 100 It appears
that Fisher would only be satisfied if White applicants were
absolute and perpetual winners in relation to Black and Brown
applicants in the admissions process at the University of
Texas at Austin. In other words, White applicants would have to
be collective mandatory winners in Fisher’s mind, even if Abigail
Fisher, herself, would have to suffer exclusion to maintain the
underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities at the
University of Texas’ Austin campus.
Still, the federal courts heard Fisher’s case. That the
federal courts entertained Abigail Fisher’s case is a great
departure from the Court’s previous affirmative action cases.
Never had the Court considered whether universities were
required to admit unqualified applicants solely because the
applicants were White (which is the case here since Abigail
Fisher never claimed to be as equally qualified as any
admitted student, regardless of race or ethnicity, but merely
offers to redefine the qualifications to advantage herself).
Moreover, such consideration was and remains a departure
from the expectations of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment: that similarly situated people are
treated similarly. 101 Fisher was not similarly situated to
applicants because White applicants who have low socio-economic status
substantially outnumber Black applicants who are have low socio-economic
statuses. Id.
99. See id. (explaining that there are many more White Americans than
Black or Brown Americans in poverty in terms of absolute numbers; thus,
reliance on class would result in larger numbers of White applicants being
admitted through the holistic review process than Black or Brown applicants).
100. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 657 (5th Cir. 2014)
(noting that Black and Latino students admitted through the holistic review
process represented only 3.3% of all students admitted into the University of
Texas in Abigail Fisher’s application year).
101. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (illustrating that the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to ban disparate treatment of similarly situated persons).
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minorities or non-minorities who were admitted (or even
considered and not admitted) since she did not exhibit the
minimum qualifications to merit further consideration.
Setting aside Fisher’s lack of qualifications, the federal
court’s entertaining of Fisher is problematic for a number of
other reasons. The University of Texas at Austin admits many
times more White applicants through its holistic review process
than it does Black or Brown applicants.102 Abigail Fisher
argues, in part, that the admission of Black and Brown
applicants is the reason for her failure to receive admission
into the University of Texas at Austin. 103 Fisher’s argument
fails to acknowledge that the number of White students
admitted through the holistic review process is many times more
than that of Black and Brown students. 104 Likewise, the number
of White students admitted through the holistic review process
is
five-fold
that of
Brown students. 105 With such
overwhelming preference for White applicants, it is
abundantly clear that Fisher’s assertion that Black and
Brown students stand in the way of her admission is, and
was at the time of her complaint, erroneous.
Moreover, the message to Black and Brown Americans is
clear: White Americans must not only be advantaged in the
college admissions process, but White Americans must also
win every time. As mentioned above, Abigail Fisher was
woefully un(der)qualified and ill-equipped to compete with the
much
more
qualified
applicants—both
minority
and
nonminority—in the University of Texas at Austin’s applicant
102. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex, at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 240 (5th Cir. 2011)
(explaining that University of Texas’ College of Social Work had a quarter
Hispanic and more than 10% African-American students, the College of
Education had 22.4% Hispanic and 10.1% African American students and the
College of Business Administration had only 14.5% Hispanic and 3.4% AfricanAmerican students).
103. See id. at 217 (arguing that the UT’s admissions policies discriminated
against them on the basis of race in violation of their right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment).
104. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 663, 661 (5th Cir. 2014)
(portraying the admission compositions of the income class from 1996 to 2008).
105. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265 (1977) (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
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pool. 106 Instead of the federal courts encouraging Fisher to work
harder and apply for admission at a later time or consider
other educational or occupational pursuits, Black and Brown
Americans—who have worked hard to gather the requisite
qualifications for admission—have been targeted as the
primary reason for Abigail Fisher’s poor performance. It is
unmistakable that the core of Abigail Fisher’s argument and the
federal courts’ entertaining of her case is that even unqualified
White applicants may request further vetting of admitted
minority applicants, for it is apparently unreasonable to assume
that some racial and ethnic minorities might be better qualified
that any or all White applicants.
Moreover, Abigail Fisher’s analysis of the few Black and
Brown students admitted fails to recognize that Black and
Brown students may contribute to diversity in ways that extend
beyond their racial identities, just as the case was in Gratz and
Grutter. The Supreme Court has mandated that race not be
the sole determinant of admission or rejection from admission
to public universities in the United States. 107 The Court has
encouraged universities to consider various forms of diversity
in selecting their incoming classes. 108 Despite this order,
Fisher and the Court refuse to acknowledge that Black and
Brown students might contribute to diversity in numerous
manners. The admission classes in recent Supreme Court
cases have counted the numbers and percentages of Black and
Brown students without mentioning that these students might
contribute to diversity in a number of ways. According to Abigail
Fisher’s arguments, even constitutionally compliant affirmative
action plans are racial quotas or programs that limit the seats
106. See Fisher, 758 F.3d, at 638–39 (explaining that nearly all the seats in
the undeclared major program in Liberal Arts were filled with Top Ten Percent
students, so Fisher would not have been admitted with her Academic Index
score). This suggests that Fisher’s rejection was not a near-miss but rather an
indication that her qualifications were no match for her competitors. Id.
107. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 246 (2003) (concluding that the
University’s policy of distributing 20 points to every single “underrepresented
minority” applicant solely because of race was not narrowly tailored to achieve
educational diversity).
108. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (stating that an
admissions program must be flexible enough to consider all elements of
diversity).
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open to White applicants. 109 This argument should fail on the
grounds that it is conceivable and generally provable that
Black and Brown applicants have diverse experiences that are
intersectional. Why might a White male also be a great chess
player, a Peace Corp volunteer or activist while the same is
not true for Black and Brown males? How could a White
female contribute to the diversity of a school through her
experience as a sexual orientation minority, a single mother, or
as an athlete, but a Black female or Latina not have the
same ability? The assumption and lack of investigation into
such intersectionality is troubling, if not racist, in and of itself.
Thus, while Abigail Fisher and the federal courts encourage
society to view the various frames of diversity that White
applicants might provide, the same parties encourage society to
view Black and Brown applicants as only providing a very static
example of diversity.
Another display of the use of house rules in Fisher addresses
the irony of the inability of Black and Brown people to use
disparate impact analysis in cases relying upon the Equal
Protection Clause. To avail oneself of the Equal Protection
Clause, Black and Brown plaintiffs must prove not only
impact, but also intent. 110 While the same is definitely true of
White plaintiffs, it is troubling that the full or near full
exclusion of Black and Brown people from some segments of
life is not quite grounds for a lawsuit based on the Equal
Protection Clause. Here, as is usually the case, only a few
109. See Fisher, 758 F.3d, at 646 (rebutting argument that the University of
Texas’ Affirmative Action plan was a racial quota merely because there was the
potential of using race as one of many factors in admissions decisions).
110. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (arguing that
disparate impact alone is not enough to use the Equal Protection Clause to
invalidate a statute and explaining that the complainant must show an
invidious motive for passing and implementing the challenged statute). In
Washington v. Davis, the court denied the challenge of Black applicants aspiring
to become police officers. Although race was mentioned as one part of the
secondary review at the University of Texas-Austin, all parties could avail
themselves of this advantage. Thus, the statute was facially neutral and should
not have been eligible of an Equal Protection Clause challenge. The University
of Texas-Austin does not pretend that the secondary review does not assist
racial and ethnic minorities, but the University of Texas-Austin also does not
have control over the construction of the processes by which students are
admitted into the university. Id.
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White people, who were un(der)qualified for admission, were
denied admission into the incoming class. Although the
admissions process is generally known to be very competitive,
the fact that even one Black or Brown person is offered
admission ahead of a White person is the crux of Fisher’s
frustrations. It is becoming customary for White applicants
disgruntled with their mediocre or subpar performance to
blame not all accepted applicants but only applicants who are
racial or ethnic minorities. Given that education is a commodity
that allows for entry into a higher educational, social, and
occupational class, it is no shock that litigants such as Fisher
are interested in limiting these opportunities for applicants
who are racial or ethnic minorities. While the Court, according
to its precedent, would not find the general exclusion of racial
minorities to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the
very suggestion of a White applicant—no matter how robust,
moderate, or shabby his or her qualifications are as compared to
only students who are racial and/or ethnic minorities—demands
the most exacting review of the federal courts.
D. Schuette v. BAMN: Raising the Policy-Sanctioning Bar for
Affirmative Action Policies
The Court’s consideration of Fisher was striking for many
reasons. 111 First, the case approving of the University of Texas
at Austin’s use of affirmative action originated in the Fifth
Circuit, long known for its conservative opinions. Having
survived the scrutiny of the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court
effectively punted Fisher back to the Fifth Circuit. This is
perhaps because the Court was unwilling or otherwise
hesitant to so quickly overrule its decision in Grutter. In many
ways, no one got what they expected in Fisher. Proponents of
educational equity through affirmative action feared the
overturning of Grutter and likely the end of affirmative
action. Opponents of affirmative action were hopeful for the
worst fears of proponents of affirmative action. At the last
111. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 636 (5th Cir.
2014) (alleging that the University’s race-conscious admissions program
violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
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stroke of the federal courts’ pens, very little drama had taken
place. Much more was feared and hoped than was done in
actuality. The Supreme Court would, however, sanction the
changing of the house rules—yet again—in less than one year.
In Schuette v. BAMN 112, the Court would allow opponents of
affirmative action to specifically burden proponents of affirmative
action with the task of amending the constitution to achieve
educational equity through opening the doors to state higher
education campuses.
Having failed to defeat affirmative action in Fisher and
more importantly, Grutter, the conservative wing of the
Supreme Court issued a potential vanquishing blow to
affirmative action policies in Schuette. The Court allowed
White populations to place the civil rights of minorities to a
vote when the court approved of a Michigan ban on race-based
affirmative action plans that favored racial minorities. 113 The
Court gave a nod to the Michigan constitutional amendment
although other forms of affirmative action such as alumni,
athletic and donor preferences—all with racial implications
albeit indirectly—were not similarly targeted by the
amendment. 114 The relevant facts of Schuette are simple to
recite. As a result of their inability to have affirmative action
programs at the University of Michigan struck down as facial
violations of the Equal Protection Clause, opponents of
affirmative action in Michigan sought to ban racial equity in
higher education at state-sponsored universities via a
statewide referendum on the rights of minorities. 115 The state of
Michigan placed the civil rights of Black, Brown, and American
Indian would-be-students to a popular vote. Not surprisingly, a
112. See Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1623 (2014) (holding that no
authority in United States Constitution would allow judiciary to set aside
amendment to Michigan Constitution prohibiting affirmative action in public
education, employment, and contracting).
113. See id. at 1624 (questioning whether voters in the States may
choose to prohibit the consideration of such racial preferences).
114. See id. at 1629 (stating that under the amendment, race-based
preferences cannot be part of the admissions process for state universities).
115. See id. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court
discards those precedents that recognized that when the majority
reconfigures the political process in a manner that burdens only a racial
minority, that alteration triggers strict scrutiny).
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predominately White electorate voted to cease and desist efforts
at achieving educational equality for Black, Brown, and
American Indian students in Michigan. With its endorsement of
Michigan’s actions, the Supreme Court of the United States
would allow White Americans to change the house rules. No
longer were the rules that civil rights should not be voted
upon by the general public; the new rule would be that civil
rights are up for public debate and vote. 116
It is hard to conceptualize a change of rules more drastic
than what occurred in Schuette. In the most obvious manner,
opponents of affirmative action in Michigan changed not only
the rules but also the nature of the game itself. Efforts at civil
rights have seldom gained steam among popular voters. It is for
this reason that the federal courts have intervened to protect
civil rights of minorities from the tyranny of the majority.
Schuette gives every racial minority solid reasons for doubting
those who argue towards trusting the political system with
the civil rights of minorities. 117 By definition, as a minority,
these groups are unable to win elections that pit their political
aims against the political aims of the majority. 118 It is
unnecessary to look to recent history for this concept as
applied to racial minorities. Consider the following examples.
One can only imagine the results if White American
Southerners had been asked to vote on the end of slavery. Well,
there is not much need for imagination: we know what
happened when White American Southerners considered voting
on the end of slavery. Southern states voted to secede from the
United States. Later, the most costly war in our nation’s
history—in terms of human lives—was waged to resolve this
very question. More appropriate to this Article, White
116. See id. at 1629 (stating that some voters in Michigan set out to
eliminate the use of race-sensitive admissions policies and that Proposal 2
was passed by a margin of 58 percent to 42 percent).
117. See id. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (finding that the only policy
a Michigan citizen may not seek through the process used by everything else is
a race-sensitive admissions policy that considers race in an individualized
manner when it is clear that race-neutral alternatives are not adequate to
achieve diversity).
118. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2015) (defining “minority” as “the
smaller in number of two groups constituting a whole; specifically: a group
having less than the number of votes necessary for control.”).
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Americans were asked to vote—through the integration of
schools—on a movement towards educational equity for racial
minorities by way of school desegregation. We need not
postulate the results of that vote although there was never a
formal election on the issue. The resolution of that question
also involved federal troops although to a m u c h lesser
capacity than the Civil War. Public opinion, as requested by the
Supreme Court, never reached a point that would afford
racial minorities adequate, equitable, or equal educational
opportunities. Because of the difficulties of being a minority
and having political goals in direct opposition to the majority,
the Supreme Court had previously frowned upon the act of
putting the civil rights of minorities to a vote or subjecting
those rights to a heckler’s veto. In Cooper v. Aaron, the Court
ordered the desegregation of Arkansas’ public schools
notwithstanding the threat of upsetting those opposed to such
desegregation. 119 It did so against voter-sanctioned measures in
Hunter v. Erickson120 and Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 1. 121 In both cases, the general population attempted to
thwart movements towards civil rights and equity via
constitutional amendment. 122 Both times, the Court intervened
and struck down those constitutional amendments. The Court

119. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (rejecting the
contentions of the Arkansas Governor and Legislature that there is no
duty on state officials to obey federal court orders resting on the Supreme
Court’s considered interpretation of the United States Constitution).
120. See generally Hunter v. Erickson, 89 S.Ct. 557 (1969) (explaining that
an amendment of the city charter violated the Equal Protection Clause by
allowing regulations based on race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry
when approved by a majority).
121. See generally Wash. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 102 S.Ct. 3187 (1982)
(deciding that an initiative prohibiting schools from requiring students to attend
a school geographically nearest them, but allowing school boards to assign
students away from their nearest school for reasons other than racial
desegregation, violated the Equal Protection Clause).
122. See id. at 3188 (attempting to terminate the use of mandatory busing
for purposes of racial integration in the public schools of the State of
Washington); Cooper, 358 U.S. 1, at 1403 (deciding that there was a duty for
state officials to obey federal court orders resting on the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Constitution, specifically the decision in Brown v. Bd.
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
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would reverse course in Schuette and condone the very actions
it forsake in Hunter and Washington. 123
IV. Towards an Understanding of the Power to Set House Rules
It is important to summarize how the Supreme Court
delivered to White Americans the power to set house rules
and how that power has been protected, not only by the
Supreme Court’s decisions b u t also by the Court’s decisions to
hear cases. Starting with the Court’s decisions in Brown I and
Brown II, the terms of desegregation attempts would be set by
the public mood as displayed by White Americans.124 The terms
put forth by White Americans included delaying the
desegregation of the nation’s public schools until the Court
would tolerate no more delays. When required to desegregate
public schools, recalcitrant school districts avoided meaningful
desegregation attempts by implementing halfhearted school
choice plans designed to maintain racial segregation in the
public schools as opposed to implementing plans that would
undermine racial segregation in the public schools. The Court
would strike down most of those choice plans as not effective
at remedying the immediate and lingering effects of statesponsored segregation. Efforts at segregation would not,
however, die quickly or easily. The Supreme Court would later
accept the idea of a suburban veto and allow for White
Americans who opposed the idea of desegregated public schools
to opt out of the process of desegregating the nation’s public
schools.

123. See Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014) (“Democracy does
not presume that some subjects are either too divisive or too profound for public
debate.”).
124. See Brown I, 74 S.Ct. 686 (1954) (ruling that segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and
other tangible factors may be equal, deprives the children of the minority group
of equal educational opportunities, in contravention of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Brown II, 75 S.Ct. 753 (1955)
(explaining that racial discrimination in public education was unconstitutional
and restored cases to docket for further argument regarding formulation of
decrees).
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In many ways, the development of a school choice agenda
d id more than just privilege White Americans. It also allowed
White Americans to avoid accepting fault in the statesponsorship of segregation while also allowing them to change
the conversations about desegregation (from desegregation to a
parent’s control of their child’s upbringing) and, most
importantly, the rules by which desegregation would occur. In
a couple of decades, the Supreme Court’s rule that schools be
desegregated without respect for opposition transformed—
through
a
challenge
from
White
Americans—from
desegregation at all costs to an exception that some White
families may opt out of the desegregation of the nation’s public
schools.
In the K-12 setting, Whites not only had the statesanctioned power to set pace, but they also had the statesanctioned power to set the rules as well as change the rules
midcourse. This power transferred to the higher education
setting. First, White males challenged affirmative action
programs benefiting racial minorities on the grounds that
qualified White applicants were purportedly shunted in favor of
unqualified racial minorities.125 Though this iteration of the
facts of Bakke is generally accepted, a close read of the Court’s
decision reveals that Allan Bakke was afforded the opportunity
to choose which indicators would best support his
admissibility. 126 He chose standardized test scores, in which he
easily outclassed his competitors. Neither Bakke nor the Court
examines or gives credibility to the Medical School’s assessment
of Bakke’s in-person interview as being lackluster. 127 After
Bakke, the rule was that presumptively qualified White
applicants could challenge minority admittees as presumptively

125. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 266 (1978)
(describing plaintiff’s argument that he was excluded from admission in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause because applicants with lower scores
than him were admitted).
126. See id. at 277 (focusing on the grade point averages, MCAT scores, and
“benchmark scores” of the applicant).
127. See id. (noting that Dr. Lowrey, Bakke’s faculty interviewer, gave him
the lowest of his six ratings after the interview).
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unqualified based on unreliable, but supposedly objective,
standardized test scores. 128
White Americans would later change that rule in the
Michigan affirmative action cases. Unlike Allan Bakke, the
plaintiffs in the Michigan cases never put forth an argument
that minority students were under or unqualified. 129 To the
contrary, the qualifications of the applicants who were racial
minorities was nearly stipulated; nevertheless, the Court
would hear the complaint of White applicants who were upset
that equally qualified applicants who were racial minorities
were accepted for admission into the competitive state
school. 130 The rule was no longer that presumptively qualified
White
applicants
could
challenge
the admission
of
presumptively unqualified admittees who were racial
minorities. 131 Now, starting in 2003, White applicants who were
presumptively qualified could also challenge the admission of
presumptively qualified admittees who were racial minorities. 132
More poignantly, the unspoken and unwritten new rule after the
Michigan affirmative action cases was that White applicants
had to maintain an advantage over applicants who are racial
minorities, even if all applicants in question were equally
qualified.
128. See id. at 377 (stating that race is positively correlated with difference
in GPA and MCAT scores, but economic disadvantage is not, which is how Davis
chose 16 of the 100 positions in the class—spots were reserved for
“disadvantaged” minority students).
129. See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (arguing instead
that the University of Michigan Law School admissions policy encouraging
student body diversity violated their equal protection rights); Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244 (2003) (alleging that the University of Michigan’s College of
Literature, Science, and the Arts’ use of racial preferences in undergraduate
admission violated the Equal Protection Clause).
130. See generally Grutter, 539 U.S.; see also Gratz, 539 U.S..
131. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277 (1978)
(arguing against refusal of admittance because “disadvantaged” minority
students were admitted with lower test scores).
132. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (describing the law school’s goal as seeking
to “assemble a class that is both exceptionally academically qualified and
broadly diverse,” and seeking to “enroll a ‘critical mass’ of minority students.’”);
see also Gratz, 539 U.S. at 244 (noting that the University had considered
African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans to be “underrepresented
minorities,” and stating that it was undisputed that the University admitted
virtually every qualified applicant from these groups).
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Just about a decade later, White Americans would change
the rule yet again. In the affirmative action case out of Texas,
the Court would fail to dismiss the suit of an under- or
unqualified White applicant who would challenge the admission
of more qualified applicants who were racial minorities. 133
Despite the fact that the White applicant could not have
been admitted, even if she were a racial minority, the Court
would entertain her lawsuit. 134 Most interestingly, the plaintiff
in the Texas case—just as in almost all other affirmative action
cases—only challenges the admission of the more qualified
racial minority applicants. 135 She never challenges the
admission of White applicants who comprised the largest and
disproportionate share of students admitted. 136 The Court’s
hearing of Abigail Fisher’s complaint was another shift in the
rules. Not only could presumptively qualified White applicants
challenge the admission of presumptively unqualified applicants
who were racial minorities, 137 presumptively qualified White
applicants could also challenge admittedly qualified applicants
who were racial minorities. 138 Fisher establishes yet a new rule
133. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2413 (2013)
(holding that the Fifth Circuit did not hold the University to the demanding
burden of strict scrutiny articulated in Grutter and Bakke, so remanded back to
the district court).
134. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex, at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 223 (5th Cir. 2011)
(describing how Fisher was denied after the University accepted students from
the top ten percent of their class automatically and then utilized a Personal
Achievement Index to be used with an Academic Index, based on high school
rank, standardized test scores, and curriculum, to merit applicants not
adequately reflected by their academic scores).
135. See id. at 240 (alleging that the University’s consideration of race in
admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause even though UT’s College of
Social Work had a quarter Hispanic and more than 10% African-American
students, the College of Education had 22.4% Hispanic and 10.1% African
American students and the College of Business Administration had only 14.5%
Hispanic and 3.4% African-American students).
136. See generally id.; see generally Fisher II, 133 S.Ct. 2411.
137. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 2736
(1978) (arguing that the Medical School’s special admissions program operated
to exclude Bakke from the school on the basis of his race, especially because
special applicants were admitted with significantly lower scores than Bakke’s in
both years of application).
138. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 244 (2003) (noting how the LSA
considered petitioners Gratz and Hamacher to be within the qualified range but
both were denied, claiming that the University’s use of racial preferences for
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for challenging affirmative action in federal cases, admittedly
under- or unqualified White applicants can challenge the
admission of admitted qualified applicants who are racial
minorities. Of course, the corollary to this rule is that it is now
allowable, although it has not always been, to place the civil
rights of minorities to popular vote when the Supreme Court
chooses not to set aside the civil rights of racial minorities.
To be able to set the rules of a game is powerful. To be able
to change the rules of the game—midstride—might be
insurmountable. In many race-related cases in education,
White Americans have set the initial rules for access, but
they have also held a Supreme Court-endorsed power to alter
those rules as racial minorities rise to overcome the barriers
imposed by the initial rules. Even the most qualified racial
minority is subject to the approval of the least qualified White
Americans under the rule in Fisher, but such approval will
only be granted after racial minorities prove beyond a shadow
of a doubt their qualifications. Even that is not assured,
however. Such is the educational life of a racial minority in the
United States.
V. The Impacts of the House Rules Privilege on Racial
Minorities: Placing the House Rules Privilege in the Context of
Critical Race Theory
Because White Americans have access to and do use the
House Rules Power, efforts at equity— as opposed to
equality— have done little to deliver racial minorities to a
better place and space than during or before Jim Crow. There
might be a different group of racial minorities with facially
different lots in life, yet the result is the same, if not worse, for
racial minorities. Once again, the script (roles) have changed,
but the cast(e) is the same. This argument makes sense when
evaluated within the philosophy of Critical Race Theory.
“underrepresented minorities” in undergraduate admissions violated the
Fourteenth Amendment); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 306 (2003)
(stating that petitioner maintained a 3.6 GPA and 161 LSAT score and claimed
that she was rejected because the Law School used race as a “predominant”
factor).
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Ladson-Billings and Tate IV best describe Critical Race Theory
as a documentation of how traditional civil rights law has and
is regularly co-opted to benefit White Americans. 139 LadsonBillings and Tate IV reassert the traditional doubt of Critical
Race Theorists: that incrementalism in the context of civil
rights may be and often is insufficient to obtain adequate and
appropriate remedies towards equity for racial and ethnic
minorities. 140 Although Critical Race Theorists do not all
subscribe to one set of imperative and concrete tenets (and could
not while also supporting the theory of individual narrative),
there are some predominately agreed upon tenets of the Critical
Race Theory Movement. These tenets focus on the endemic and
continuing nature of race and oppression in our post-modern
and post-racial society, the intersection of power and politics
in shaping institutional disadvantage towards racial and ethnic
minorities, a critique of the liberal agenda and the restrictive
nature of interest convergence on effective civil rights
remedies, and the need for counternarratives to challenge
concepts of race and racism.
The exclusive application of Critical Race Theory in the
context of education began with the work of Gloria LadsonBillings and William Tate IV. 141 Though acknowledging the
broader work of Critical Race Theory, the authors specifically
discussed how specifics tenets of Critical Race Theory are
applicable in education. In doing so, Ladson-Billings and Tate
IV established several broad application points for Critical Race
Theory in education: 1) that racism is part and parcel of life in
the United States, 2) the need for the reconstruction of historical
narratives and 3) confronting the concept of race neutrality,
colorblindness and meritocracy. 142 Given the slant of the article
139. See Gloria Ladson-Billings & William F. Tate IV, Toward a
Critical Race Theory of Education, in 97(1) T E A C H E R S C O L L E G E R E C O R D
47, 62 (1995) (describing critical race theory).
140. See id. (suggesting that inequalities are a logical and predictable
result of a racialized society in which discussions of race and racism
continue to be muted and marginalized).
141. See id. at 47 (“This article argues for a critical race theoretical
perspective in education analogous to that of critical race theory in legal
scholarship. . . .”).
142. See generally id.
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written by Ladson-Billings and Tate IV, one could more
appropriately position their seminal work on Critical Race
Theory in Education as having a predominately primary and
secondary education focus. 143
Other scholars have considered how Critical Race Theory
might be applicable in the context of higher education. Payne
Hiraldo applies the tenets of Critical Race Theory to the
context of higher education but focuses predominately on issues
occurring while students are enrolled; little attention, however,
is paid to the process for obtaining and assuring equitable
inputs. 144 Likewise, Shaun Harper has discussed how Black
male students are “niggered” on the campuses of
Predominately White Institutions. 145 Harper, Patton and
Wooden apply Critical Race Theory to other aspects of higher
education. 146 Among those covered in the paper are higher
education funding laws and policies, HBCU desegregation, and
affirmative action programs. 147 Though the paper by Harper
and colleagues discusses the role—albeit dwindling—of the
interest convergence theory, 148 something seems too amiss
143. See generally id. (discussing the education of children as well as
high school-aged children).
144. See Payne Hiraldo, The Role of Critical Race Theory in Higher
Education, 31 THE VT. CONNECTION 53, 53 (2010) (analyzing critical race
theory in the context of diversity and inclusion in higher education).
145. See Shaun R. Harper, Niggers no more: A Critical Race
Counternarrative on Black Male Student Achievement at Predominately
White Colleges and Universities, 22(6) INT’L J. OF QUALITATIVE STUD. IN
EDUC. 697, 697–712 (2009) (describing how 143 interviews across the United
States with black male undergraduates demonstrated that black men are
resistant to racist stereotyping).
146. See Shaun R. Harper, Lori D. Patton & Ontario S. Wooden, Access
and Equity for African-American Students in Higher Education: A
Critical Race Historical Analysis of Policy Efforts, 80(4) THE J. OF HIGHER
EDUC. 389, 389–414 (2009) (using critical race theory to understand how
white racist ideology has developed, and exploring reasons why AfricanAmerican men have lower rates of enrollment and degree attainment in
higher education).
147. See id. at 398–400 (discussing African-American enrollment
declines, funding inequities, forced HBCU desegregation, affirmative action
and race-based policies at Predominately White Universities (PWI)).
148. See id. at 409 (explaining how the interest-convergence principle is
manifested in that white people will support efforts for African Americans
when their own interests are not threatened, or when they too stand to gain
benefits).
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when arguing that interest convergence can explain away the
attacks on affirmative action.
A. Do White People Get to Play By “House Rules”?
Recall the story of Thanksgiving Day at my close friend’s
home. My fraternity brother and I stood no chance at all to
win that game of Spades. We never knew that the only way for
the game of spades to be played was for the other team to win.
The rules to the game continued to change, and each time that
my fraternity brother and I would overcome a rule change,
another rule would change and create yet another obstacle to
be overcome by our team. The excuse for each rule change
was always the same, “This is how we play in our house.” The
rule changes only occurred when our opponents could not defeat
our team using the then-existent rules. Furthermore, if the rule
changes were always actual rules, those rules appeared
purposefully unclear to our team at the beginning of the game;
thus, we were wholly unable to take advantage of rules that
might have been advantageous to our team in earlier rounds of
the game. Despite our best efforts at perfection, there came a
point where the other team finally came out on top.
Immediately, the game ended. To this day, my fraternity
brother and I joke about the imposition of “house rules.”
Before moving forward with this analysis, it is important
to provide a succinct definition of the phrase “house rules.”
House rules are not a s t a t i c set of rules at all; instead, house
rules come with the power to set, impose and alter rules as to
provide a sought after and predetermined result. At first blush,
it is difficult to determine how to position house rules in light
of Critical Race Theory. This difficulty arises because house
rules is not an explicit tenet of Critical Race Theory but rather
explains how the compilations, the intersections, the
interchangeability, the robust nature of racism in and of its
facets operate to cripple the ability of traditionally
marginalized and disenfranchised groups to overcome the everamorphous and ever-arising barriers set before them in
American society. In fact, when these groups do find ways to
overcome, they may find that new barriers are constructed.
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These new barriers often arise without notice and are not
foreseeable by disadvantaged and marginalized populations.
House rules played out in the creation of the school
choice/suburban veto movement at the primary and secondary
education level. Perhaps because of Ladson-Billings and Tate
IV’s work, Critical Race Theory has been most used and
therefore most useful for analyzing power, politics and policy
at the K-12 level as opposed to in higher education scholarship
where scholars have particularly addressed affirmative action
policies and other policies in higher education in light of
Critical Race Theory; 149 the house rules power is a little more
difficult to situate solely in the primary and secondary level of
education. The most evident use of the House Rules Power in
primary and secondary education was the creation of a rule to
disconnect the past racist actions of Whites who had newly
moved to the suburbs to avoid desegregation in Milliken. 150
Though it had not been historically the case, the holding in
Milliken would thereafter allow for parents seeking to escape
the requirements to desegregate the ability to opt out by
merely moving across what is the equivalent of an arbitrary,
if not often imaginary, geographic boundary. 151
149. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707
(1993) (explaining that the concept of whiteness as a protectable property
interest is the epicenter of affirmative action); Kwame Agyemang & Joshua
DeLorme, Examining the Dearth of Black Head Coaches at the NCAA
Football Bowl Subdivision Level: A Critical Race Theory and Social
Dominance Theory Analysis, 3 J. OF ISSUES IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
35–52 (2010) (using critical race theory in examining why there are so few
Black head coaches at the College Level); Harper, Patton & Wooden, supra
note 146, at 390 (analyzing how racist ideas have shaped policies in higher
education using critical race theory as a lens); see also Harper, s u p r a n o t e
1 4 5 , a t 697 (using a critical race theory approach to discuss the student
achievement of Black male college students at predominantly white colleges
and universities); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Underrepresentation of
Minorities in the Legal Profession: A Critical Race Theorist’s Perspective,
95(4) MICH. L. REV. 1005 (1997) (discussing how to use critical race theory
ideas to fix the issue of underrepresentation of Blacks in the legal
profession).
150. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. 717, 718 (1974) (holding that it was improper to
impose a multidistrict metropolitan remedy for single-district de jure
segregation in this case).
151. See id. at 725 (explaining how the Detroit Board of Education created
and maintained optional attendance zones which had the “natural, probable,
foreseeable, and actual effect” of allowing white pupils to escape identifiably
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House rules are not limited to use in primary and
secondary schools although they might have arisen from the
Court’s reasoning(s) in those cases. House rules have always
been utilized in the context of affirmative action in higher
education. Allan Bakke used house rules to determine what
portions of his application would be granted the greatest—and
dispositive—weight. 152 The Court added to Bakke’s use of
House Rules by defining diversity in a way that would allow
White applicants to be advantaged, even in application pools
meant to open doors for racial and ethnic minorities. 153 It was
clear that Whites could choose whichever portion of their
application was most advantageous to contrast against minority
student applications in an effort to prove that White applicants
were objectively meritorious as compared to racial minorities.
This rule was relatively effective since racial minorities lagged
Whites on standardized test scores for decades. 154 As minority
students performed better on standardized tests, a new rule
was needed. The Court would move from allowing White
applicants professing to be more qualified than racial minority
applicants to challenge admissions decisions to allowing White
applicants who held no purported competitive edge against
racial minority applicants to challenge admissions decisions.
Instead of dismissing the plaintiffs’ cases in Michigan as a case
where a school—with a limited allotment of seats—chose one
qualified candidate over another, the Court would sanction an
investigation into the qualification of admittedly qualified
applicants who were racial minorities. Even that rule needed
some tweaking, however. The Court would then allow
admittedly under- or unqualified White applicants to challenge
the admission of admittedly qualified applicants who were
racial minorities. Finally, the Court—unable to reach a
Negro schools).
152. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
153. See id. at 267 (holding that race may be one of a number of factors
considered by school in passing on applications).
154. See The Widening Racial Scoring Gap in Standardized Tests for
Admissions to Graduate School, THE J. OF BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. (2006),
http://www.jbhe.com/news_views/51_graduate_admissions_test.html
(finding
that Black students have historically and continue to lag behind their White
counterparts on standardized tests).
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consensus on either granting or excluding racial minority
applicants equitable methods into higher education—decided
to allow one more rule change. Now, the Court would allow
the civil rights of minorities to be put to public referendum.
Though the plaintiffs in most anti-affirmative action cases
declare motives based on race-neutrality and meritocracy, it is
inescapable and unnerving that White applicants only
challenge the admission of racial minorities in some
circumstances. This is particularly relevant at the
undergraduate level. In the cases of the University of
Michigan and University of Texas, White undergraduate
students challenged the admission of either equally or more
qualified racial minority applicants. 155
Both federal court decisions are void of any analysis of the
impact of affirmative action admissions of Black athletes. Where
it is proven that student-athletes are routinely admitted with
lower test scores than their nonathletic counterparts, 156 one
would expect—at least—some challenge to the admission of
applicants
who
are
presumptively
less
academically
meritorious than the applicant-plaintiffs for admission into the
University of Michigan or the University of Texas under the
plaintiffs’ own analyses. Critical Race Theory provides a lens for
analyzing the lack of challenges to the disproportionate
admission of Black athletes: the interests of the rejected
White applicants are in some way aligned with the interest of
Black athletes. The enrollment of Black athletes, who are
assumed to be more athletic and less intelligent, 157 promotes
155. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 303 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the plaintiffs did not argue that the minority plaintiffs
at issue failed to meet the prescribed criteria); see also, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 638–39 (5th Cir. 2014) (discussing that no student with
Fisher’s scores were admitted into Fisher’s preferred academic programs).
156. See Jamel K. Donnor, Towards an Interest-Convergence in the
Education of African-American Football Student Athletes in Major College
Sports, 8(1) RACE, ETHNICITY AND EDUC. 45, 49 (2005) (explaining that this
is particularly the case at the University of Michigan Ann Arbor—the site
of the Gratz case—where the typical athlete admitted to the university on
average scores an astonishing 364 points less on the SAT than their nonathlete counterparts).
157. See Harry Edwards, The Black ‘Dumb Jock’: An American Sports
Tragedy, 131 THE C. BOARD REV. 8, 8–13 (1984) (explaining how false
expectations for Black athletes to be dumb encourages their social
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institutional advancement, 158 and institutional advancement
benefits White students. 159 This argument is in sync with
Derrick Bell’s foundational Critical Race Theory tenet, interest
convergence theory. 160 The racial circumstances of high paid
coaches and essentially free-wage athletes in NCAA Division I
is eerily similar to slavery with White people dominating the
high paid positions and Blacks dominating the moneyproducing, low-paid positions. 161 With this knowledge, it is not
surprising that White would-be-applicants fail to consider the
impact of Black male athletes on reducing the number of
available spots for White students’ admission.
The case of Black athletes is also explainable by the
theory advanced previously in this Article: diversity should be
pursued in higher education so long as White applicants may
also benefit without suffering undue loss of power and
privilege. Black athletes contribute to diversity while not taking
the place of White students. In many ways, Black athletes often
place themselves in harm’s way for the sake of advancing the
institution while assuring that White students’ place(s) at the
institution will not be put in harm’s way.
The institution and White students benefit in multiple
ways from the presence of Black athletes. The existence and
attention of a competitive sports program has financial and
reputational rewards. 162 What is more important is the fact
that Black athletes have lower graduation rates from postsecondary schools 163 and often do not provide competition in the

exploitation).
158. See Donnor, supra note 156, at 49 (“Consequently, the institutional
pressure to compete annually for prestige and revenue not only defines a
student athlete’s existence on campus; it explicitly tells him where to
concentrate his energies for the next four or five years.”).
159. Id.
160. See id. at 57–63 (stating that Bell believed that judicial relief for
racism only occurs when it directly or indirectly furthers the best interest of
the nation rather than the group that suffered the injustice).
161. See generally Agyemang & DeLorme, supra note 149.
162. See Donnor, supra note 156, at 49 (“[T]he more successful a football
program is, the more that institution is able to enhance its image and
market itself as a first-rate university.”).
163. Id. at 46.
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job markets dominated by White degree holders. 164 Black
athletes, therefore, serve to entertain White students during
their college years and get to be easily dismissed after their
usefulness to the institution and White people has expired.
Supporting this thesis is the fact that Black athletes account
for over half of all Division I athletes, yet Black athletes
struggle to get the most profitable jobs in college athletics after
graduation, positions for which they might be most qualified
to hold. 165 In other words, the pursuit of diversity is an
excellent endeavor when 1) there is a perceived benefit that does
not undo the privilege and power of being White (before,
during, and/or after collegiate studies) and 2) a White person is
able to monitor the Black players—keeping them in check—
while making large sums of money from what is routinely
considered amateur sports. This may not seem to be a changing
of the rules, and in fact, it is not. There is no need to change
the rules for most athletes since large numbers of Black
athletes will return to their rightful, subjugated place in
society after completing their respective tasks. That is, of
course, unless White people allow otherwise.
B. Amendment Rather Than A Replacement: Passive and Active
Racism in the Context of the Foundation of Critical Race Theory
The early foundations of Critical Race Theory implied but
did not explicitly state the amorphous nature of racism and
when those foundational texts did address the amorphous
nature of racism, they did so in language concerning the
institutional impositions of racism. This language has been
more recently co-opted to provide an intervening and
preventive step in addressing the individual culprits of racism.
From its beginning, Critical Race Theory has challenged the
Court’s efforts at addressing racism as ineffective due primarily
to the Court’s fascination with addressing only some explicitly
stated forms of racism. Critical Race Theorists have responded
to the Court’s ineffectiveness in remedying racial inequity,
164. See id. at 50 (arguing that Black male athletes in major sports are
enrolled in less rigorous courses than their peers).
165. See generally Agyemang & Joshua DeLorme, supra note 149.
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inequality, and oppression through substantial debate around
the ideas of interest convergence, perspectives on remedying
racism, unconscious racism, and Whiteness as property. This
subsection places the idea of a House Rules Power in the
context of the early foundations of Critical Race Theory.
One must fully understand the requisite circumstances to
utilizing the House Rules Power. To use the House Rules
Power, White Americans must be able to participate in both
passive and active racism. 166 Passive racism is the scenario in
which White Americans may and often do intentionally opt
into the systemic structures that enable and perpetuate the
oppression of racial minorities. 167 Passive racism has the
appearance of a systemic problem because intent is hard to
identify; moreover, passive racism does not involve a clearly
discernible individual motive against racial minorities and
towards racial oppression. 168 White flight is passive racism.
Through White flight, White Americans are opting into a
structure that has the result and is fully intended to place
racial and ethnic minorities in a particular subjugated caste.
Some may argue that White flight is systemic racism; in other
words, while some White Americans are opting into White
flight, the structure of White flight is racist but the individual
White flighters are not racist. 169 It goes without saying,
however, that White Americans must make individual and
intent-driven choices to perpetuate White flight. The school-toprison pipeline is another form of passive racism. Through the
school-to-prison pipeline, the educational system is opting to
place and contain Black and Brown students in particularly
low castes, or in prison. Some have argued that the schoolto-prison pipeline is a version of systemic racism, but what is
most true about the school-to-prison pipeline is that educators
must make individual choices to remove Black and Brown
166. See generally BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS
SITTING TOGETHER IN THE CAFETERIA: AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE 11
(1997) (conceptualizing the difference between active and passive racism).
167. See id. (explaining how passive racism is more subtle than active
racism).
168. See generally id.
169. See id. (stating that not all White people are bad people, but that White
people, intentionally or unintentionally, do benefit from racism).
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students from inclusive educational settings, and in making
these choices, these individual educators are empowering the
racist system. Despite efforts purporting to create interventions
to stem the school-to-prison pipeline, there need not be any
intervention to stop the school-to-prison pipeline. If society
desires to stop removing Black and Brown students from
schools, policymakers and policy implementers could choose to
1) not create policy that is aimed to specifically address
students who are racial and/or ethnic minorities and/or
2) simply not remove Black and Brown students from school.
The other side of the requisites for the use of House
Rules is active racism. 170 Active racism is the scenario in
which White Americans may and often do opt to use systems
that specifically target racial and ethnic minorities for
identifiable oppression and exclusion. 171 Active racism has a
clear—though often overlooked—racial motive. Challenges to
affirmative action policies are active racism. Through
challenges to affirmative action policies, White Americans have
only sought to exclude racial and ethnic minorities. For instance,
in the Michigan and Texas cases only the admission of racial
minorities was challenged despite the fact that 1) the
Michigan plaintiffs never alleged that the admitted racial
minorities were under- or unqualified 172 and 2) the federal
courts acknowledged that every admitted racial minority in the
Texas case was more qualified than the plaintiff. 173 To fully
effectuate the use of house rules, White Americans must be
able to opt into systemically racist structures; thus, passive
racism is the preferred type of racism. This option mutes the
need for consistent and persistent explicit individual
oppression; thereby, White Americans do not have to face the
ghastly charge of individual and overt racism on a daily
basis. Occasionally, passive racism is ineffective at effectuating
the magnitude of necessary oppression against racial and
170. See id. (describing “active racism” as “blatant, intentional acts of racial
bigotry and discrimination.”).
171. Id.
172. See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
173. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir.
2014).
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ethnic minorities. In this case, passive racism becomes active
and overt attacks against minorities occur to quash further
efforts at equity. Passive and active racism are not mutually
exclusive; instead, the two are necessary components of each
other. Active racism is necessary to create systems that
passively racist White Americans can later opt into without
expressed intent to discriminate (and the concomitant reproach
from a post-racial society).
Evidence of the House Rules Power and its prerequisites
(passive and active racism) exist from the foundation of Critical
Race Theory. Many Critical Race Theory scholars have
intimated, if not explicitly stated, the changing nature of race
and racism in American society. For instance, Professor Derrick
Bell’s Theory of Interest Convergence asserts that the remedies
of the Civil Rights Movement exist in large measures with the
conjoined values of the White and Black populations. 174 Not
only do the remedies of the Civil Rights Movement serve to
support Bell’s theory, so do the plaintiffs’ and the federal
courts’ actions in affirmative action cases. The fact that White
plaintiffs in affirmative action cases have not challenged the
admission of Black and Brown athletes into selective state
universities is explainable in that the interest of those Black and
Brown students converge with the interests of White dominant
society. 175 Professor Bell’s theory does not, however, answer all
questions pertaining to the argument against even equally or
more qualified Black and Brown students (as compared to
White applicants) seeking admission into state universities, for
even White dominant society considers these students as
objectively better prepared for post-secondary studies. Here,
the contrast between passive and active racism is useful. It is
possible and likely that White Americans may have experienced
interest convergence during the initial phases of desegregation
and affirmative action. 176 It is also possible, and Bell has argued,
174. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (suggesting that it is
better to focus on quality education for Blacks rather than ensuring racial
balance at schools).
175. Donnor, supra note 156, at 45–67.
176. See Bell, supra note 174, at 525 (stating that Whites realized that
segregation was a barrier to further industrialization of the South).
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that this interest convergence might have been begrudged. 177
If, in fact, Whites experienced reluctant interest convergence,
then there may never have been a true disdain for racism among
White dominant society writ large. White Americans may have
been willing to deal with affirmative action so long as they lost
nothing—or very little—in the movement towards racial equity.
Starting with Bakke, White Americans could be passively
racist and opt to challenge the qualifications of racial
minorities on test scores alone since admissions test scores
were often skewed in favor of White applicants and against
racial minorities. 178 These challenges appeared ostensibly
nonracist since the objectives were lodged on “objective”
measures of merit. The ability to opt into passive racism
appeared to be in jeopardy in Gratz and Fisher; standardized
tests were no longer as effective a barrier against minority
applicants. White Americans needed active racism, and active
racism came in the form of changing the rules to allow
challenges to the admission of even objectively qualified racial
minorities. Thus, passive and active racism fit well within
Bell’s Theory of Interest Convergence. When interests
converge, racism is typically passive. When interests diverge,
racism becomes active to recast(e) systems to allow for further
and enhanced passive racism.
The concepts of passive and active racism may be properly
situated in the foundations of Critical Race Theory outside of
Professor Bell’s Theory of Interest Convergence. Passive and
active racism fit within Alan David Freeman’s analysis of civil
rights case law from the perspective of perpetrators versus
victims’ perspectives. Freeman’s argues that the Court’s
analysis of civil rights challenges has occurred in the context of
the perpetrator’s perspective as opposed to the victim’s
perspective.179 Freeman argues that evaluation of civil rights
177. See id. at 523–28 (citing the outside factors requiring interest
convergence).
178. See generally Maria Veronica Santelices & Mark Wilson, Unfair
Treatment: The Case of Freedle, the SAT, and the Standardization
Approach to Differential Item Functioning, 80 HARV. EDUC. REV. 106 (2010)
(explaining how the SAT is proven to function differently for Blacks and other
White subgroups, and how this phenomenon should be further researched).
179. See generally Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
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cases through the lens of a victim’s perspective would give a
more robust and effective remedy for racial and ethnic
minorities because such a perspective would provide more
flexibility to deal with the social and historical circumstances
as opposed to individual yet shapeshifting actions that are
associated with racism and oppression. 180
Freeman’s argument appears to set the stage for the
development of ideas and ideals of systemic racism. 181 He even
predicts the Court’s discussion of a needed critical mass in his
discussion about the “tipping point” 182 and, most importantly,
addresses the issue of intentional racism. 183 To add another
facet to Freeman’s theory, the active and passive theory of
racism challenges not the existence and/or intentionality of
individual racist acts but asserts that even “unintentional” or
systemic racism is intentional racism. As previously stated, to
consciously opt into systemic racism is an actual and
intentional act in and of itself. Thus, to exculpate individual
actions under a theory of the institutionalism of racism is
patently wrong. Allowing for the option and existence of
institutional or systemic racism has accomplished numerous
objectives for those choosing racism (whether passive or
active). Perpetrators of racism have been able to use a stealth
and robust form of passive racism to perpetuate extant forms
of overt racism. Perhaps a soothsayer of sorts, Freeman’s
allegation that a victim’s perspective in civil rights cases
would result in a more useful and manipulative approach to
advancing meaningful civil rights remedies has come true in the
converse: a perpetrator’s perspective has allowed a more
useful and manipulative approach to preventing meaningful
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (using Supreme Court cases to
question how racial discrimination is illegal and yet Black Americans often
find themselves in disproportionate amounts of hardship).
180. Id.
181. See id. at 1102 (stating that the Court had offered to black people
expectations of proportional racial political power, a working system of equality
of opportunity and integrated schools and then these expectations were
systematically defeated).
182. See id. at 1076 (explaining that there is a level where a “tipping point”
will be reached where the white majority will leave the area if the quota of black
people reaches a certain point).
183. See generally id.
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civil rights remedies. Likewise, denial of the impact of racism
is a purposeful rejection of others’ realities.
Further connections between passive and active racism
exist between the foundations of Critical Race Theory when
accounting for Charles R. Lawrence III’s assessment of
unconscious racism. Lawrence III asserts that “the injury of
racial inequality exists irrespective of the decision makers’
motives.” 184 Lawrence proffers an argument using slips of tongues
to address unconscious racism. 185 He later attests that slips of
tongues are products of larger societal issues paving the way
for greater oppression of racial minorities. 186 Lawrence
concludes his essay by noting that the Supreme Court and the
academic establishment may be slow to adopt approaches that
address unconscious racism. 187 It is necessary to further develop
or contest Lawrence’s theory of unconscious racism to place the
concepts of passive and active racism into a concept of
unconscious racism unless the term unconscious racism is a
misnomer. I submit that Lawrence does not speak of
unconscious racism because he specifically discusses the
reliance of unconscious racism on the acceptance of cultural
stereotypes. 188 I propose that to accept a cultural stereotype
and to not explicitly reject one are offenses with similar results,
processes, and intentions. The similar result is the further
perpetuation of the stereotype. The similar intent is to leave
intact the options for passive racism. The similar process is
choice. In other words, to accept the concept that Black men
are violent, uneducated, or whatever other unsavory stereotype
may exist has the same intent of not challenging those very
same stereotypes. The non-challenger and acceptor may easily
dismiss any individual or overt racism while blaming the extant
oppression of the group stereotyped on societal oppression
rather than the individual and overt decision to not opt out of
the very privilege allowing the non-challenger and/or acceptor to
184. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 319 (1987).
185. Id.
186. See generally id. at 333–39.
187. See generally id. at 387–88.
188. Id.
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experience some tangible benefit. Given this scenario, it is
possible and probable that all “unconscious” racism is to some
extent intentional and conscious though it is comfortable to
think otherwise. In many ways, people may be merely picking
when to assert their power, privilege, and prejudice under the
cover of accidental or more appropriately incidental racism; they
may also be picking to preserve the option to slyly opt into
what can then be proclaimed to be mere accidental racism (or
racism by mistake). 189
In the interest of clarification, the importance of intent (or
lack thereof) must be addressed at this point. The very
structure of society’s parsing of intent is based on the notion
that one’s actions become less vile if the actor’s actions can be
proven to lack a certain degree of intentionality. This
argument takes the perpetrator’s perspective. This perspective
misplaces the power to design remedies in the hands of the
perpetrator by restricting the victim’s wide range of potential
grievances and emotions and allowing the perpetrator (or some
other person or entity) to construct and assess the perpetrator’s
culpability. In many ways, the legal system has acculturated
society to assume the importance of intent. Sliding scales of
intentionality and culpability might be appropriate for crimes,
but their use in oppression is severely inappropriate. For
instance, despite the fact that manslaughter and murder
have the same consequence, the intent of one makes the
perpetrator’s culpability greater than the other. Assessing the
189. I admittedly do not understand the concept of accidental racism.
While I experience very little struggle in understanding how one might
accidentally trip and fall, burn his or her morning toast, or lose a sum of
money, I have greater difficulty understanding the circumstances under
which one might—by mere mistake—be racist. Could one be not paying
enough attention while talking to or texting a friend and—for reason of
lack of attention—be racist? Could one be in a hurry to work and
absentmindedly—for reason of haste—bring his or her racism to work?
Under what conditions is such racism completely disconnected from some
previous choice to be racist? I remain confused on the appropriateness
of a phraseology that considers any form of racism or oppression as
mistaken. It is more appropriate to refer to what is commonly misnamed
accidental racism as incidental racism, or racism that coincides or rather is
triggered by certain events. In the theory of passive and active racism, I
need only be actively oppressive when the incidence occurs that jeopardizes
my ability to be passively oppressive.
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perpetrator’s culpability under a sliding scale of intentionality
assumes, however, that there are sliding scales of harm
occurring as the result of racist acts. This is patently untrue in
most, if not all, cases of oppression.
There are not sliding scales of racism; racism, whether
commissioned by lack of intention to the aggrieved party
(assume here that the perpetrator by not recognizing the
existence of the victim is stripping the victim of his or her
humanity) or for reason of intentional harm, has the same
impact for the victim. Sliding scales of intent and culpability
do, however, allow White Americans and especially White
liberals, to disassociate their bad acts with the bad acts of
other, more racist White people. At its core, sliding scales of
intentionality and culpability allow White Americans to be
“not that racist,” maintaining the structures and benefits of
oppressive systems while only making marginal, if any,
progress towards equity. When the victim’s perspective is
taken, the idea of intent becomes somewhat of a legal and
practical fiction. The victim of a racist act will seldom care if
the perpetrator of the act acts without “intention” for the
pain will almost certainly be the same, except that the pain
might be more if the victim viewed the perpetrator as an ally or
someone who might otherwise not be expected to be racist.
Intent, under the victim’s perspective, does not matter for only
the perpetrator may feel good about his or her “unintentional”
transgression. The perpetrator is allowed to mold a story
where he or she becomes a protagonist (hero for being less
racist than a Klansman) or a redemption-seeking antagonist
(as racist as a Klansman but seeking improvement). The
victim does not enjoy a similar privilege.
Passive and active racism are finally linked to the
foundations of Critical Race Theory as a parallel to Neil
Gotanda’s theory of formal race as opposed to racial
subordination. Gotanda propounds a Critical Race Theory
framework that challenges the judicial system to cease and
desist the ignoring of racial subordination in favor of the
court’s preoccupation with a view of race that dismisses and is
decoupled from the historical realities of racial oppression. 190
190.

See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of ‘Our Constitution is Color-Blind’, 44
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Gotanda properly understands the mutable nature of racism
and racial oppression in this avowal. Moreover, Gotanda
advances a framework that assumes that “[s]ubordination occurs
in the very act of a White person recognizing a Black person’s
race.” 191 It is important under the concept of passive and active
racism to understand that subordination also occurs in the
very act of a White person opting to be White and exercise
Whiteness to their advantage. 192 Cheryl I. Harris has also argued
for an understanding that Whiteness and the status of being
White has a court-protected property interest; 193 understanding
that Whites may subordinate other races by merely opting into
Whiteness is near the core of passive racism. White Americans
can be passively or actively racist by opting into Whiteness,
particularly, those parts of Whiteness that represent systems
and institutions of oppression and subordination. As previously
argued in this section, Whites are also passively racist by
choosing to opt out of challenging systems and institutions of
oppression and subordination. In many ways, refusing to
challenge racially oppressive structures or pretending that
those structures do not exist is opting into Whiteness. Whites
are actively racist by choosing to actively exclude and/or
oppress racial and/or ethnic minorities.
Though numerous other connections exist between the
concepts of active and passive racism and the foundations of
Critical Race Theory, time and space limit the ability to make
such connections. Notwithstanding those limitations, it remains
important to situate and ground active and passive
representation within the Critical Race Theory frameworks.
Moreover, it is paramount to assess both individual, overt
racism and systemic (or institutional racism) in the context of
STAN. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1991) (examining the benefits and drawbacks of a
social and political model of a color-blind constitutionalism versus a model
that addresses racial categories).
191. See id. at 26 (stating that racial classification assumes that there is
a pure race and results in racial subordination, while advancing white
interests).
192. See Harris, supra note 149, at 1709 (discussing the economic and
racial supremacy that a property interest in Whiteness has had over
Black and Native American people throughout the history of the United
States).
193. Id.
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passive and active racism. This is particularly true of systemic
racism, which may pardon the intentional and overt choices of
White Americans to take advantage of systems and institutions
constructed to maintain and/or expand systems of oppression.
VI. Conclusion: Moving Forward
In many ways, the foundations of Critical Race Theory
explain the existence of the House Rules Power. Questions
arise when considering the factors necessary for the effectuation
of the House Rules Power and the effectuation of that power: Is
systemic racism the same as overt racism? Do the two operate
concurrently? Could it be that the idea of systemic/institutional
racism could be used to obfuscate occurrences of overt racism?
I suppose that institutional racism is at its essence another
form of individual and overt racism. It is often regarded as
ungracious to be overtly racist in contemporary society.
Perhaps this societal expectation is misstated. Might it be
more acceptable to be occasionally racist, much like one might
be an occasional drinker or smoker? Does this same result hold
for a social racist, or one that is racist in certain social
environments? A more distant look at the Court’s decision in
race-related education cases reveals that it is okay to be racist
as long as one can blame the faux pas on systemic racism as
opposed to individual, overt racism although the two are the
same.
While anti-racist minds continue to endeavor to uncover
ways that systemic racism has displaced or become more
prevalent than overt racism, it is necessary to start assessing
the coexistence of the two. In many ways, the House Rules
Power reveals the unique ability of racism to oscillate between
systemic and overt, at the whim of White Americans. The
Supreme Court’s case law reveals that the house changes the
rules midgame when White Americans are no longer
prohibitively favored for college admissions. Of course, one
middle-class, hardworking White applicant must be sacrificed to
change the rules, but those Whites who are sacrificed still win.
They might just as well be called martyrs. When racism wavers
between systemic and overt manifestations, White Americans
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are, thus, protected from the dreaded label of being individual,
overt racists. This occurs because systemic racism tends to
absolve individual White Americans of the guilt of the many
racist choices involved in embracing systemic racism. The
argument is that the system is unfair, not the individual
person. It is far easier to declare that the perpetuation of
exclusionary, oppressive and racist practices are examples of
systemic—or more appropriately in this case “accidental”—
racism rather than examples of individual or series of intentional
acts of racism. In other words, the perpetrator of the racist act
is not racist per se; he or she is simply unaware of the racist
impact of their actions.
There is, however, a more pernicious fact about treating
systemic racism and overt racism as two independent
phenomena; it creates the ability for racism (and racists) to
hibernate or become dormant. The House Rules Power is only
successful because it operates in an alternative space of
passive and active racism. Under a theory of passive and
active racism, even systemic racism is actually overt in that
it specifically allows for Whites—who can disguise themselves
as unbiased pursuers of racial justice and equality (as opposed
to equity)—to become overtly racists when necessary and avoid
blame by distorting the true intent of their actions: to disrupt
the progress of racial equity for racial minorities or protect
their own power positions. This happens when a system has
been designed to stymie the progress of a racial minority
group.
This happened when the Court—in Bakke—allowed Allan
Bakke to choose how he could be compared to minority
candidates and simultaneously expanded diversity to include
examples that would make White applicants eligible. 194 By
focusing on test scores, which have handicapped racial
minorities, the Court assured that the system could continue to
privilege membership in the White race as opposed to others.
The Court would expand the process of identifying diversity to
allow for schools to be diverse in many ways while avoiding
racial diversity. The Court would establish a new rule when
194. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 265–
320 (1978).
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too many racial minorities would overcome the barriers of
standardized tests. Now even equally qualified racial
minorities needed intensified vetting beyond the traditional
application process and conducted by the highest court in
the land, to assure they are acceptable as replacements for
White applicants. The Court would focus on the role of
systemic racism in preventing the admission of applicants who
were racial minorities, but that focus is misplaced. Systemic
racism is overt racism. The plaintiffs in both Michigan and
Texas contested the admission of applicants who were racial
minorities on race alone. In Michigan, the qualifications of the
admitted racial minorities were not challenged. In Texas, the
admitted racial minorities were better qualified than the
rejected White applicant. Still, the challenge moved forward.
Notably, under- or unqualified White applicants—though they
existed in both Michigan and Texas—went unchallenged.
There is nothing systemic about an individual White plaintiff
challenging only racial minorities who were admitted into an
elite university; this is individual and overt racism, yet the
White plaintiffs in those cases are allowed to escape the
identification and the scrutiny that accompanies such
identification because their racism was perpetuating a racist
system while those same racist plaintiffs are hailed as martyrs
for the cause of racial oppression.

